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ABSTRACT
An exploration of Software Product and Program Management as recently emergent roles
in the information technology sector is presented. The exploration is presented in six
sections divided into two major parts. The first part, in four sections, explores Product
Management from a primarily anthropological and managerial perspective, while the
second part, in two sections, explores major engineering issues related to the role.
The first part gives a synopsis of the history and economics of software products,
demonstrating the rapid evolution of a field facing unprecedented problems with product
complexity and motivating the need for Product Management. The role of Product
Manager is explored in detail using both extant literature and interviews conducted with
current practitioners in industry. The related role of Program Manager is briefly
discussed. Finally, an extended historical case study is presented demonstrating the
struggles and pitfalls of Product Management in software product companies.
The second part explores two major engineering issues related to the Product
Management role: Project Management and Requirements Engineering. A survey of
major Software Project Management methods in use is given along with critiques of their
effectiveness. Finally, the emerging field of Requirements Engineering is studied, with
the conclusion that purely analytical methods such as semi-formal modeling cannot
obviate the need for social process methods. Such methods take into account the
tendency for human communication problems both to sabotage and to become embedded
within software systems.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael A. Cusumano
Title: Sloan Management Review Distinguished Professor of Management
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Preface: 8 Years in Silicon Valley
A thesis is personal, at least in terms of motivation, and I have chosen to use this
section to speak briefly but personally about my experiences leading up to the writing of
this work. Only a sketch, of course, and a lot is left out, but then this is a preface and not
a memoir.
Once upon a time, in 1999, every company, startup, dot com idea, dynamic duo of
a programmer and an MBA, almost any organization engaged in the production of
software--especially Internet related software--was viewed as a potential gold mine, or as
an oil drilling operation near-certain to end up a gusher. Irrational exuberance ruled the
day. I lived through the days of euphoria, and struck it rich (temporarily) in the days
when Internet-based enterprise software could do no wrong. My company, BroadVision,
Inc., peaked as an S&P 500 company with a $29 billion market cap. Venture capital
money poured into anything Internet or "dot com" related.
Humanity does this sort of thing every so often. We all have a weakness for the
potential quick buck; coincidentally, the heart of the Internet gold rush was in roughly the
same place as the literal Gold Rush of 1849: in San Francisco and the surrounding Bay
Area. Yet the surface gold, easily accessible, quickly ran out, and many gold seekers
died paupers. According to one historical site, "James Marshall - the original discoverer
of gold - died on his claim in the gold fields in 1885 without even enough money to pay
for his burial." [1] Although hopefully most of the Internet gold rush participants would
have more luck rebuilding their future, many found their wealth decimated or destroyed.
After what I call the Dot Com Bomb, by late 2001, businesses were going down
left and right. January 8 th, 2001, I walked into my office on a Monday morning at a
customer relationship management (CRM) company called North Systems. I was a
consultant, charging $110 an hour as my own agent, the kind of money I never dreamed
one could get without being a lawyer. I had just taken a long holiday vacation. My
cubical had been moved, and all my equipment was unplugged. I found my manager.
"What's going on?" I asked.
"It's over. The company's dead."
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I looked into his eyes, and saw that they were slightly wild. In a second, I noticed
he was unshaven, haggard, with a light sheen of sweat on his forehead. He clearly wasn't
joking. He had worked 50 - 60 hours a week for this wildcat startup for two years, and
would walk away with nothing. What could I say?
Amazingly, they paid my final bill. Yet it was the beginning of the end of my 8
year career in the San Francisco Bay Area. Company and product launch parties were
soon displaced by "Pink Slip parties" for laid-off IT workers, and these parties often had
lines out the door. Contracts suddenly became scarce and rates deflated drastically.
Startups were dying even faster than they once popped up just a year before. What had
gone so horribly wrong? Part of it was certainly just human nature, the Gold Rush
mentality gone wild.
Yet something deeper was wrong with the business of software, something that
plagued businesses before the Internet boom and continues to plague them today. Fred
Brooks knew part of the story by 1986, as virtually every software manager knows: there
is "No Silver Bullet" to ease the creation of software.
Software is hard.
Less pithily but more descriptively, the creation of wealth through the writing,
marketing, and selling of software as a sustainable business is incredibly difficult. This is
what I learned during my triumphs and struggles in the Silicon Valley, as I tried to keep
my head above water programming incredibly complex systems while watching the
NASDAQ slowly (then quickly) drown.
My own insight is not, "software is hard." My insight, rather, is this: In spite of
the painful lessons of history, managers at all levels in business today somehow persist in
believing, as evidenced by their actions, "software is easy." Managers consistently
underestimate the difficulty in implementing a given set of functionality. They
consistently underestimate the expense of maintaining a system. They underestimate
both the importance of and the difficulty with intra-corporate communication, especially
between Engineering and Marketing, about what a software system actually does, could
possibly do, and should do in the future. A general distrust between Engineering and
Marketing is endemic (one might say epidemic) in the software industry.
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Communication channels between the two are often neglected, and a silo effect occurs,
devastating to a software business dependent on a well marketed product.
These are the problems which motivated this thesis. After experiencing the lofty
highs and crushing lows of the Silicon Valley software business, I've become sensitized
to the fact that commercial software is far from a MMOP or a "Mere Matter of
Programming." Human factors, business factors, can easily prevent the best engineered
software from becoming a market success. My hope is that this thesis will shed a little
light into the abyss between the engineering and the business, especially the marketing,
of software.
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I. Introduction
Software has exploded onto the stage of virtually every aspect of public and
private life in the past half-century. With origins in publicly funded military and
aerospace systems, software quickly trickled down into universities, privately held
businesses, hospitals, homes, cars, stereos, microwave ovens, digitally encoded neo-
Walkmans such as the iPod, cell phones, and, of course, our now-ubiquitous Personal
Computers. To paraphrase MIT Professor Nancy Leveson, the advent of microprocessors
capable of running general-purpose software has given us the capability to build a single
generalized machine and create a near-infinite number of specific machines from it.
Corporate or enterprise software has also become critical to the running of
virtually all major businesses in the modem world. The 2003 Chaos Report indicates
that, unfortunately, only 34% of IT projects were considered successes, with only 52% of
originally allocated requirements appearing in finished projects.[2] One paper by
Christof Ebert of Alcatel claims that there is a "Bermuda Triangle" effect between the
marketing, strategy, and technical aspects of software development into which product
success gets lost due to the lack of agenda coordination.[3] The extremely rapid pace and
inherently complex nature of software development makes total life cycle management of
a product's business value-Product Management-uniquely challenging in the software
/ IT sector. Even a small incremental improvement in the area of software product
management could yield great dividends in a field experiencing a project success rate
well under 50% as virtually all sources agree.
The central theme of this thesis is software product management, a topic about
which surprisingly little has been written. The role is probably the most strategic and
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cross functional non-executive level (or C-level) role in the modem software corporation.
Due to the highly cross functional nature of the Product Management role, it is necessary
to explore the "satellite themes" of Program and Development (or Project) management.
The original goal of this work was to draw a bright line around the Product Management
role, exhaustively explaining all duties, the ideal toolset, and at least a skeletal outline
tantamount to an instruction manual for the performance of the job. Exploration into the
role slowly revealed that this task is about as tractable as writing an explicit manual
entitled "How to be a Good CEO." There are few bright lines and pinpoint answers to be
found, no list of command directives to be a good Product Manager.
Thus, we explore the role as if tightening a perimeter around elusive prey. First,
we motivate the role from a historical perspective, examining the rapid rise of the new
class of highly complex software products, and the emergence of the Product and
Program Management roles in the software industry. We briefly examine the intense
hype of the Internet gold rush, and the terrible crash back to reality, as well as some of
the economic factors unique to software products. These factors demonstrate the difficult
and fast-paced environment creating the need for the Product Manager. They do not
define him exactly, but quarry, if you will, the block of marble where he exists from the
surrounding rock of a difficult market. We then chisel at that block, exploring more
directly the role of Product Manager in an attempt to sculpt a likeness. Lacking a tight,
abstract definition of the role, we turn to modem industry. Interviews with three
prominent practicing Product Managers help triangulate a definition of the role as
practiced today. We'll also look at the overlapping role of the Program Manager,
emerging as if fashioned by Microsoft from a rib of the Product Manager. (No gender
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bias is implied-if anything the Program Management role is slightly skewed male
compared to the Product Manager role, which splits about two-thirds male to one-third
female).
After directly exploring Product and Program Management, we examine in detail
a historical case study, attempting to illuminate the roles further in a recent historical
"Clash of the Titans" in software products. The David and Goliath browser wars of
Netscape versus Microsoft demonstrate the strategic maneuvering of two powerful foes
in attempting to position their products and drive them into market dominance. These are
precisely the broad strategic issues Product Managers face in their daily lives, although
often on a somewhat smaller and less public scale. Yet Product Managers have to make
smaller scale versions of strategic maneuvers exactly like those of Gates, Barksdale, and
Andreessen, because in many companies the Product Manager is truly the CEO of the
product.
The final third of this work focuses on engineering methods relevant to Product
and Program management. Both roles are involved with the discipline of Development
or Project management. First we examine a topic at the cutting edge of practice, the
controversial and intensely studied emergent discipline of Requirements Engineering.
We take a brief look at the current practice of RE today, and then examine several
emergent methods, including a detailed examination of a semi-formal method under
research in the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab at MIT. Finally, in
consideration of the Product Manager's duty to schedule or at least monitor projects, we
delve into a survey and review of both time-tested and recently emergent Project
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Management methods, examining how they affect company culture and the role of the
Product Manager.
We conclude with a retrospective on Product Management: what we do know,
what is still uncertain, and what aspects of the role will likely never attain the status of a
"solved problem." In the final analysis, we can learn a great deal from industry practice
and continue to improve tools and methods, but no replacement of the need for vision and
leadership in the role (and in the related roles of Program and Project management) is
foreseen.
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II. The Software Product Problem Arises: History,
Economics, and the Strangler Tree
Factors Motivating Product Management
As outlined in the Introduction, it is difficult to draw a "bright line" around the
Product Management role. This section explores historical and environmental factors
motivating the creation of Product Management as a role in the firm. First, we delve into
a philosophical exploration of the awesomely complex nature of software systems, which
translates into complex software products. This is followed by a selective elucidation of
the frenetically paced history of software products, with winner-takes-all battles requiring
superior management for mere survival, let alone success. The timeline and historical
emergence of Software Product Management and invention of Program Management are
briefly studied.
We conclude with a pass over a detailed slice of software history, with an eye to
the associated economic forces, that being the recent Internet boom and bust. These
economic factors do not directly define the Product Management role, but are critical to
understand as they define the strategic environment in which modem Product, Program,
and Project management take place.
Godlike Powers and the Strangler Tree
Mankind has not yet wrapped its collective mind around the possibilities software
creates, which makes sense as software is possibly the most powerful single technology
invented for the extension of that mind's power. Software is pure design embodied; by
far the closest man has come to achieving the godlike power of thought made flesh. In
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existence for less than a century, software has revolutionized mankind's pursuit of
scientific knowledge (if not wisdom), enabling him to, for instance, land a remote
controlled robot on Mars and scan, at least to a first, gross level, his own genome.
Of course, godlike powers do not generally come easily or without peril.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads accurately across
the globe to annihilate most of humanity still sit quietly in their silos, ready to fly and
find their targets using software. Hellfire missiles launched from pilotless airborne
vehicles controlled remotely through a television screen, and many similar devices, could
not exist without software and make even conventional war and killing perhaps far too
easy and impersonal. Creation of deadly chemicals, biological weapons, and a host of
other evils can be made possible or at least radically accelerated by software. All
technologies of great power can be wielded to the great good or terrible ill of humanity,
and somewhere along the line generally end up getting used for both.
Yet perhaps the greatest difficulty mankind faces in the future of software is not
the question of how it is used so much as how it evolves. Sheer complexity is the enemy
of software. Complexity creeps into large software systems like a slowly spreading
disease. Like the strangler trees of the equatorial forests, complexity softly slithers its
way into the subroutines and interfaces of systems, seeming innocuous until one day a
major modification must be made to the system. Engineers merrily continue to develop
the "feature of the day" until that moment, like new branches and leaves growing on the
tree. Eventually, however, the day comes that the unavoidable modification must be
made: a major change to the intent and functionality of the system.
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In nature, the strangler tree (see Figure 1) eventually kills the underlying host tree,
choking it to death while the strangler lives on, holding the same shape as the original
tree. Similarly, complexity eventually kills all software systems of sufficient size: there
is still life, the system is still somewhat functional, but it simply becomes impossible to
alter the intent or basic functionality of the system to any significant degree. The power
of software may be potentially godlike, but we human beings do not have the minds of
gods.
Figure 1: Strangler Tree in Mosman Gorge, Australia (S. MacGregor, 2002) (Source:
http://www.pbase.com/mscotnsep/image/10019085/large)
In fact, we humans have rather strict cognitive limits. The reader may be familiar
with the now-near-proverbial "7 plus or minus 2" rule stating that most people can hold
five to nine items in short term memory. Software systems these days can easily run into
millions of lines of code with thousands or tens of thousands of subroutines, methods,
function calls, interfaces, and other intangible entities to keep track of. The United States
Air Force's Theater Battle Management Core System is one example of a system having
major issues with the software strangler tree. It is a mega system trying to integrate a
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huge diversity of "strangler tree" systems: mature military systems rife with unmanaged
complexity whose intents and functionality can no longer be significantly changed.
What forces exist to counter such complexity? To counter the problem of
strangler-tree systems? In a word: competition. In two words: Commercial
competition. Competition provides the motivation for mankind to produce software
systems that overcome the strangler tree problem. This may seem a nayve or even base
idea at first. Competition? Surely there is a more scientific answer than that! Some sort
of information theory, complexity theory, set of mathematical formulas, the calculus of
software, something?
Perhaps there would be if software was a "mere matter of discovery", but
software is a combination of discovery and invention. The key, then, is not a particular
tool to solve the problem, but a robust and continuous motivation to keep pursuing better
and better solutions. That motivation is commercial competition. Nothing motivates
men like the creation of wealth. Pure curiosity certainly plays an important, and perhaps
some might consider a nobler role, but ultimately a man has to pay his bills. Bill Gates
was perhaps the first, or possibly just the most successful, person on the planet to realize
that software is fundamentally as commercial as any other product: that people and
businesses should and would pay for software. It is notable that, for all the references to
Microsoft as "the evil empire" and complaints about its monopoly power, it is the
software of this company-which approached software as a business-that truly first
drove software into the common consciousness of the entire first world and continues to
do so today, now penetrating developing countries.
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For software to work as a business, one thing has to exist: willing buyers. If
software does not sell, the expensive work of creating it will eventually put the
originating company out of, well, business. Software must create value for a buyer.
Whether that value is entertainment value or increased efficiency of running a business or
analysis of equities or pork bellies to facilitate better buying decisions, there must be
some perceived value in the software or it will never be purchased. Just as important, the
customer must actually realize value after the purchase lest the first purchase become the
last. In any other business, such statements would be considered tautologically obvious,
but software has an extremely strong culture of engineering over marketing, of
programmers over businessmen.
There is a pervasive and dangerous attitude in the industry: "If we build it, they
will come." The "they" in question are customers, paying customers. Unfortunately, the
world of paying customers is not like the Field of Dreams, and history has
demonstrated-rather harshly at the turn of the millennium-that "they", the paying
customers, most certainly will not come to whatever a business haphazardly decides to
build. Nonpaying customers may come in droves if something is mildly interesting or
strikes their momentary fancy, giving rise to such fluffy terms as "eyeballs" and
"mindshare" in the heady dot com days, but these people melt away like the morning dew
once the idea of paying comes into the picture. Those dot com operators would have
done well to realize that "nonpaying customers" is really an oxymoronic phrase. Anyone
who does not pay for a product is not actually a customer at all.
Thus, we arrive at a major point this thesis addresses. The software business
needs a greater respect for the discipline connecting written software with paying
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customers: the discipline of marketing. The business must abandon the old ways of
building supposedly cool stuff and hoping someone will buy it, and must instead actually
listen to what the market wants. This is not always easy, as software is tricky and
figuring out what the market wants may turn into a delicate process of both educating and
then listening to the potential customers. Yet performing this delicate process correctly
can make or break a software business.
Now that we have set the philosophical stage, we will turn to history for an
examination of the emergence of the key Software Product Management role. (We will
see how the derived role of Program Management emerged in the next chapter.)
The Emergence of Product and Program Management
Traditional Product Management
The job and role of Product Manager is an artifact of modern business. There
were no Product Managers in any industry in the nineteenth century or before. Of course,
a business historian could come up with a wide array of examples showing that
somebody was doing Product Management for firms earlier in history, but the role of
Product Manager as a full time job simply did not exist yet. The first company that came
to mind when researching pre-computer Product Management was Proctor & Gamble.
William Proctor was a soap maker and James Gamble was a candle maker. They joined
forces in 1837, and by the time of the American Civil War, landed a deal to provide the
Union Army with soap and candles. Today, P&G is a large consumer goods concern
with many, many famous brands from Pampers to Pringles, Crest toothpaste (Figure 2) to
Charmin toilet paper.
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Figure 2 Crest Whitening Expressions (Source: http://www.crest.com)
Most sources attribute the P&G with the pioneering of Product Manager as an
independent role worthy of a full time job in business. One Internet career source notes:
The use of product management dates back to the 1950's. Proctor &
Gamble was one of the first companies to use and develop product
management positions. Initially, Proctor & Gamble had several products
within their own company that were competing against each other.
Today, companies generally use their products to work together for the
market share and compete with products from other companies. [4]
Along Came Technology
Product Management made a lot of sense for Proctor & Gamble with its
straightforward, physical, mostly consumable products. The customer will wash his
hands or body with the bar soap, do the laundry with Tide, brush his teeth with Crest
toothpaste, and shave his face with the Gillette razor and its complement, Gillette Foamy
shaving cream. Selling these products to a maximum number of customers for maximum
profitability is certainly not a simple problem, but there is, at least, a fundamental
underlying product with essentially static functionality. Crest toothpaste, for instance,
has reached a level of extremely fine market optimization, but even the Crest Whitening
Expressions Mint toothpaste is still a tube of toothpaste used to brush the teeth. Shuman
Ghosemajumder, a Product Manager at Google, noted in his interview (Appendix B), "In
high tech products, there aren't a lot of features as in toothpaste. For instance, customers
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might like baking soda or other whitening agents, but then it's really about market
segmentation."
High technology products, especially software, have less clear utility. Software is
innately intangible, often difficult to explain, and is perceived as extremely malleable in
functionality. These factors combine to make software highly susceptible to positioning
manipulation. Unfortunately, especially when it comes to malleability, these factors also
combine to make it difficult to position software at all, or to position software such that
customers and the software pass each other like two ships passing in the night. [5]
Compared with traditional, P&G style products, software product management requires
an extremely high level of finesse and an increased focus on inbound versus outbound
marketing issues. More on those issues in the next chapter, when we study the role and
industry perspective in detail.
Product and Program Management Emerge at Microsoft
Everyone knows that Microsoft is ascendant in the world of prepackaged software
products, and that the Windows operating system is dominant on Intel-based PCs. The
short story is that this happened because Microsoft took software seriously as a product,
and more seriously than hardware, early on. They were one of the first serious users of
Product Managers and they invented Program Managers. The Windows / Intel timeline
shown in Figure 3 shows the emergence of Product and Program Management at
Microsoft long before they achieved true desktop dominance with their "hit" Windows 3
operating line. The Program Manager role, as invented by Microsoft, was a technical or
engineering / development-bound version of the Product Management role and will be
examined more closely in the next chapter.
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Figure 3 Product & Program Management Emerge at Microsoft
There is a longer story here, of another and parallel timeline involving UNIX and
Sun Microsystems. That timeline seemed to be losing relevance for awhile until the
advent of Linux and the new vitality of Open Source. Not everyone, especially younger
IT professionals, understands how this came to be. Why is this relevant to software
Product Management? Both the markets for software products, and the stage of the
competitive landscape, have been set by these powerful, parallel trends in software &
hardware history. The future stage and market, furthermore, will be to some degree
determined by the trajectory of these continuing timelines. A detailed study of these
parallel timelines in hardware and software is instructive for every Product or Program
Manager, but is peripheral to studying the history, practice, and future of the roles
themselves. Deeper looks at the timelines, their collision, and its implications for the
software market, including Open Source and commoditization, especially enterprise
software commoditization, are given in Appendix A. What we will study in more detail
in the "main line" here is the recent and very difficult landscape set up for Product and
Program Managers by the hype and crash of the Internet Boom, and some important
economic factors unique to software products and, therefore, to software product strategy.
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The Economic Landscape for Software Products in the
Internet Age
Combinatorial Innovation and Financial Speculation: the Dot Com
Boom
As in any Gold Rush phenomenon, whether the literal rush of 1849 or the
figurative Dot Com Boom of the late 1990's, a group of people or sometimes an entire
society indulges in the illusion that there is some unlimited new resource capable of
generating wealth for virtually zero or nominal effort. For a brief time, the philosophy
seemed to be, simply program anything Internet or Web enabled and make tons of
money. A prominent Silicon Valley venture capitalist described the dramatic run-up in
technology stocks as the greatest legal creation of wealth in human history. However, not
all of it was legal and not all of it was wealth. Virtually everyone involved in high tech,
or stock market investment of any kind, has seen some version of the chart in Figure 4
showing the NASDAQ bubble and crash:
100
4 00
100
2 00
Figure 4 Internet Stock Bubble & Crash (Source: http://www.ehsco.com/niisc/economv/nsdg-
decade.if)
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The NASDAQ Composite lost 78% of its value as it fell from 5046.86 to 1114.11
(www.investopedia.com). How did software products drive this bubble to appear?
Economist and information technology specialist Hal R. Varian, a professor at the Haas
School of Business, believes it is an instance of what he calls combinatorial innovation.
Every now and then a technology, or set of technologies, emerges whose
rich set of components can be combined and recombined to make new
products. The arrival of these components then sets off a technology
boom as innovators work through the possibilities.. .The attempts to
develop interchangeable parts during the early nineteenth century is a
good example of a technology revolution driven by combinatorial
innovation. [6]
Such combinatorial innovation occurs in waves or clusters, including the wave of
weapons manufacture in New England which led into a wave of domestic appliance
innovation in the early 19th century. Professor Ed Crawley at MIT has pointed out that
the entire field of Mechanical Engineering arose from the wave of innovation
surrounding the invention of the steam engine, which spawned the Industrial Revolution
and eventually became a dominant technology in the shipping industry. The internal
combustion (gasoline) engine represents another such wave.
Each of these waves is accompanied by a speculative investment boom. The
difference, for the Internet revolution, lies in its magnitude and compressed nature.
Though the intense stock market spike was completely out of proportion to business
reality, the fact is that an amazing amount of real innovation was going on at an
extremely rapid pace. Varian believes this phenomenon occurred because, "the
component parts of the Internet revolution were quite different from the mechanical or
electrical devices that drove previous periods of combinatorial growth...they were 'just
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bits.' They were ideas, standards, specifications, protocols, programming languages, and
software." He notes, "Unlike gears and pulleys, you can never run out of HTML!" [6]
The combinatorial innovation of the Internet boom was driven by a fluidity of
ideas that has never been seen in the realm of physical product creation. For instance,
open source software is like what Varian calls, "primordial soup for combinatorial
innovation. All the components are floating around in the broth, bumping up against
each other and creating new molecular structures, which themselves become components
for future development." Before the Internet, one cannot imagine similar phenomena:
Open shipbuilding? Open lightbulb design?
Real value was being created in the wave of Internet software related
combinatorial innovation, but speculative investment can always outstrip the creation of
real value as the market responds to the forces of fear and greed: in this case, greed ruled
for a short but intense time. Investors tried to rationalize the mad pace of investment and
price multiples being paid for fledgling companies by claiming that a New Economy had
emerged. Though it is doubtful that many actual economists believed in the New
Economy, investors and technologists alike clung to the idea in droves.
The "Old" New Economy for IT
On the topic of the bubble's magnitude, Varian says little, simply noting that a lot
of "dumb money" comes into the stock market when the public gets excited about a new
technology. He also does not believe in the New Economy, a notion most investors
probably became disillusioned with as they were brought down with the crashing
NASDAQ. His notion on this topic is that the so-called old economic principles work,
but some become more emphasized in the information economy: "Effects that were
24
uncommon in the industrial economy-network effects, switching costs, and the like-
are the norm in the information economy." Thus the economy is not new per se, but
certain principles do apply differently:
" Second-order effects for industrial goods are often first-order effects for
information goods.
* High fixed costs and virtually zero marginal costs are a hallmark of the software
product industry. (Varian notes that this is an idealization for most physical
production processes, but is the baseline case for software products.)
* First-degree price discrimination: IT allows, in the extreme case, for a "market of
one" or mass customization / personalization
" Switching costs are generally high in the realm of software. Switching from
Windows to Linux, for instance, can be very costly.
* Competition for new customers is intense due to the high level of customer lock-
in.
* Cost of search for consumers can be dramatically lowered on the Internet.
As of this writing, with the company Google having recently gone public, search
is the number one force driving the post-crash Internet business. Search in this context
goes beyond economic search, though it is notable that the search-based business model
thus far depends entirely on advertising-essentially a form of providing customers
search information via a push model. For retailers, attempting to achieve opaque pricing
becomes challenging in the Web world: Ellison & Ellison have found that online
retailers often engage in "bait and switch" tactics online: advertising an inferior product
at a low price to attract users to their site, attempting to confound such new technologies
as shopbots and agents that compare prices from multiple vendors. [7]
Certainly we have not examined all of the counterintuitive economic effects in the
software industry, but this survey of some of the major effects gives an indication of the
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tricky strategies related to economics which Product Managers face. We will examine
one more economic aspect of software products before moving on, that being product
interdependency for economic viability.
Economics of Systems Effects in Software
Software products have a high degree of systems effects: products are often
useless unless they are combined into a system with other products. This phenomenon is
so prevalent in software that many companies targeting the business to business market
sell software "systems" rather than "products". Even shrink-wrapped software products,
the most self-contained software available, have many systems effects, especially now
that network capabilities are expected nowadays. Take a retail PC video game: the
consumer needs a PC to play the game, a CD-ROM to read it, the Windows OS installed,
most likely a 3D accelerator graphics card, and for an increasing number of games,
Internet connectivity. TurboTax from Intuit, once a completely self-contained program
subject only to the most basic hardware system effects, now requires Internet
connectivity to download a State return as well as to file returns (if low-hassle online
filing is desired).
Software as part of systems, Varian points out, causes companies to Integrate,
Collaborate, Negotiate, Nurture, and Commoditize. [6]
* Integrate: One complementor acquires the other, a common Microsoft practice
to the point of raising Department of Justice resistance.
" Collaborate: Revenue sharing, such as the famous case of Blockbuster's
software-enabled revenue sharing between studios and video stores (rentals were
provided to stores for $0 to $8, with rental revenue split roughly in half with the
studios, allowing Blockbuster to stock many more copies and reduce rental stock
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outs). This arrangement would have run into unenforceable contract problems if
not for computerized record keeping.
" Negotiate: One firm commits to cutting its price if the other firm also cuts its
price.
" Nurture: One firm works with the others to reduce their costs. Adobe, for
instance, works with printer manufacturers to ensure that they can effectively use
its technology.
* Commoditize: One firm attempts to stimulate competition in the other's market,
thereby pushing down prices. Microsoft has established the Windows
Compatibility Lab to ensure that hardware manufacturers all produce to a
common standard. This helps facilitate competition, pushing down the price of
hardware. (Microsoft wants cheap hardware on which to run their complement,
software.)
All of these forces derived from systems effects help reduce prices, partially
counteracting the tendency in the software industry toward "high industry concentration
ratios and monopoly power." Complementors, according to Varian, "may sometimes
play a similar role" to competitors in monopolistic situations for price discipline. [6]
Still, a high degree of industry concentration exists, most notably Microsoft's domination
of the PC operating system and applications environment, but also visible in other areas,
such as Oracle's domination of the RDBMS market. The trend of a few unique and
highly consolidated winners, however, is not new to the software industry. A similar
phenomenon occurred in auto manufacture, for example, as hundreds of competing
manufacturers concentrated into the few large players today, now competing mostly
against foreign imports.
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Completing the Historical and Economic Picture
Subject to extremes of hype, overinvestment, standards battles, and systems
effects, we can see that the world of software products is fraught with peril. The need for
expert strategy to navigate such a difficult, highly competitive environment in which
forecasts are almost universally uncertain should now be obvious. Though no one can
keep all factors in mind all the time for every business decision, the management
professional with a good concept of the software industry's historical and economic
gestalt has great advantages in navigating the unstable landscape. With the historical and
economic environment clearly, though far from exhaustively established, we are ready to
move on to a direct examination of Product Management and the derived role of Program
Management.
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III. Understanding the Roles of Product and Program
Manager
Approaching the Target Roles
With our discussion of the unique historical and economic environment
surrounding software products complete, it is time to examine directly the role of the
Product Manager and its derived cousin, the Program Manager. We have seen how the
role emerged, migrating and morphing across industries. Now, we'll first take a look at
the unique new need for a focus on inbound versus outbound marketing as a job
responsibility in this role as redefined for high technology. Second, we delve into
industry perspectives researched for this work via interviews to further explore and define
the role as practiced in the new millennium. Third, we look at some concrete
responsibilities of the Product Manager, especially with respect to documentation
deliverables, as defined in the literature. Fourth and lastly for Product Managers, we take
a quick statistical overview of who Product Managers are from a demographic
perspective in modem technology companies. Finally, we look at the more technical,
Development-bound role of Program Management. Actual Project (or Development)
Management will be discussed later, in its own section, focused more on methodology
than the job and role itself.
Inbound versus Outbound: Listening versus Talking to the
Market
A primary distinction between the activities of a Product Manager became
apparent early in research for this work. The distinction is between marketing activities
considered "inbound" and those considered "outbound" by marketing professionals.
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Inbound issues involve listening to the market and designing product feature sets that can
deliver value based on what the market is telling a company. This does not necessarily
equate to what end users say they want, but to what market data actually supports. Many
customers, for instance, potential end users in a corporation, are "mouth hungry" for
features, but this does not necessarily mean the decision makers in their company will
support actual purchases based on those features. Interacting with engineering is
generally considered part of the inbound side of the product manager's job, and may be
quite dominant for some product managers, especially at more mature organizations.
The outbound side of the PM's job is the more pure marketing-oriented function,
involving talking to the market in various ways. One book on the subject defines the
outbound / inbound split this way:
Product Marketing: Writing collateral and white papers, dealing with sales
issues, providing support, talking to analysts (often called outbound
product management).
Product Management: Defining product requirements, interfacing with
engineering (often called inbound product management).
One person does both tasks in many startups.. .The combination provides
a manager with broad perspective; additionally, having one person lead
both areas is efficient and reduces the chances of misunderstanding or
miscommunication of the priorities required to shepherd the product. [8]
One set of related companies researched for this thesis, the aQuantive group,
including Atlas Solutions and Avenue A, had very specific division of labor. This
included a specific Product Management role, for inbound marketing, and a Product
Marketing management role for outbound responsibilities. Of course, these companies
are specifically Internet marketing companies and thus very focused on the marketing
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aspect of business. One would expect to find the highest level of role differentiation in
marketing for a business that has this as its core competency.
Industry Perspective on Product Management
Ambiguity in the Software Product Management Role
At Microsoft, a stagnant company in terms of stock growth recently (relative to
2006) but still essentially the Proctor & Gamble of software products, the inbound /
outbound division is not necessarily as decisive. Bill Shelton, a Product Manager at
Microsoft who submitted a brief "email interview" for this case, had the following to say
about his role at Microsoft (Appendix B):
My job involves the following activities: market opportunity analysis,
revenue forecasting, product planning, technology roadmapping and
outbound marketing messaging and positioning definition and execution.
Product Management is a very broad job title at MS that spans everything
from very internally focused business management activities to
exclusively focused marketing and communications activities. It varies by
team and specific position.
Philip DesAutels, former Product Manager at Microsoft, concurred, saying, "Bill
Shelton's is a superb definition of Product Management. He also notes of his own former
role, "I was talking to the press and being quoted in six or seven articles a week." That
much press contact seems to indicate a largely outbound focus. Yet he also claimed to be
"making sure [a series of technologies] were in sync with industry and customer's
demands," an inbound responsibility. So Microsoft, at first glance, might seem relatively
"sloppy" about dividing inbound and outbound responsibilities with regard to the
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marketing functions of Product Management. Cusumano and Selby draw a clearer
distinction in Microsoft Secrets:
Product Managers are marketing specialists; some work in product
planning as part of the product units, although since late 1993 Microsoft
has centralized most of them in division marketing groups. [9]
This distinction is consistent with Philip DesAutels' role as a cross-product
champion of Web Services. This role makes sense to perform from a central marketing
group. Still, neither DesAutels nor Shelton gave an impression of a tightly bounded role.
The best apparent explanation is that Microsoft seems to have decided to create various
strategically "sliced" Product Manager roles: some PMs bound to individual product
groups, but most in divisional marketing groups. Of the latter category, some have been
cross functionally bound in two dimensions, those being teams and technologies. All
PMs deal, to some degree, cross functionally across teams, but DesAutels' former role
indicates that at some PMs are now being bound cross functionally across technologies,
rather than singly bound to, say, Excel or Office.
Even in a company with more evolved Product Management strategy than
probably any other company in the world, the role definition still came across as
somewhat "slushy", or at least self-determined, for both Microsoft interviewees.
Literature on the topic often points toward some ambiguity in the role. One specialty
book, Software Product Management Essentials, asserts quite a large level of ambiguity
in the role:
Many professional job titles are vague, but few are as variable as that of
the "Product Manager". Even within the software industry, the definition
and role of the Product Manager varies widely. In some companies
Product Managers are responsible for managing the brand of the product
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or the entire marketing mix including lead generation and sales
support...Some companies view Product Managers as the liaison
between Sales and Engineering.. .In yet other companies the Product
Manager is the business manager for a product or a product group. As a
result, it is difficult to pinpoint a definitive role across the board for the
Product Manager. [10]
In the following section, we will take a look at the difficulty in pinpointing a
definitive role, and attempt to "triangulate" the definition of the role through the lens of
three Product Manager interviewees from three very different companies.
The Blind Men and the Elephant
The ancient Indian fable and poem by John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the
Elephant, will be familiar to most readers and has become a popular way to describe any
phenomenon understood differently by different observers. In the fable, each blind man
feels a different part of the elephant and describes the entire elephant in those terms: the
one who feels its side says the elephant is like a wall, the one who feels its tusk says the
elephant is like a spear, the one who feels its trunk says the elephant is like a snake, and
so on. Philip DesAutels, a former Product Manager at Microsoft and current Academic
Liaison, mentioned this fable about Project Management, saying, "Everyone tells you it's
something different."
Product Management is like this in that a universal, objective definition does not
exist. Front line jobs in a corporation that are not highly cross-functional and do not
involve corporate strategy usually have crystal clear responsibilities. The jobs of contract
janitor, receptionist, and telephone customer service representative are well defined. The
job of software engineer has a lot more latitude but is still a fairly well understood,
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mostly tactical role. Product Management, on the other hand, is closer to a C-level role
in having a significant element of corporate strategy involved.
If one cannot directly observe the elephant, it is necessary to speak with several
different "blind men" to try to come up with an aggregate picture of what an elephant
might be like. The PM's interviewed for this thesis were all asked, "What do you think is
the most important Product Management challenge in the particular case of software
products?" The answers varied significantly (Appendix B):
Scott Case, Atlas Solutions: People want 300 features and you can
only do 10. There are difficult tradeoffs in implementing new features.
"Who are you going to piss off who are you going to serve?" Tradeoffs
involve "keeping the lights on" versus innovation. We serve 110,000 ads
per second. 6 billion ads a day.
Philip DesAutels, Microsoft: Alignment. Alignment of people, of
stakeholders, business stakeholders, strategic stakeholders. Different
parts of the companies depending on you or pushing you. Aligning those
people together, getting those people to come together. Even if a group
is outside of the company, you have to get them to align with your
interests. It's difficult to distribute the job and has to come onto one
person.
Shuman Ghosemajumder, Google: Usability. There is so much
complexity associated with computer applications. Software is like
traditional engineering but zero marginal distribution costs. In software
you can create a "million mile long bridge." (Possible, but impractical and
useless.) Creating something that is actually usable becomes very tricky.
IPod, for instance, has 80% market share with a small, elegant feature set
as opposed to the everything-but-the-kitchen-sink approach. It's about
organization, not just limiting a feature set. There will be a market for
very advanced tools, but make the day to day tasks as fast as possible
and allow novices to pick it up right away.
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The "elephant" of Product Management's most important mission thus felt like
three completely different things to our interviewees: feature tradeoffs, stakeholder
alignment, and usability. The commonality between these aspects of Product
Management is the high degree of strategic, cross functional execution required to
accomplish the stated mission. Stakeholder alignment speaks directly to cross functional
team coordination, and the other two stated missions require alignment. Feature tradeoffs
require alignment between development, marketing, and the customer.
The same is true of usability. Ghosemajumder said of this cross functional
challenge (Appendix B),
As a PM, I try to bring the perspective of the common user back to the
teams. I draw comparisons to analogous products, conduct usability
testing-bring the product in front of actual users... .Let's create features,
technology, and then worry about usability? That doesn't work. The
biggest trap technical teams fall into is creating products that are
internally consistent and make sense to technical people, more and more
specific, worst case, that make sense only to people who work at a
specific company. Or products that make sense to technical people but
not to non-technical people. This affects everything.
Perhaps our "elephant" metaphorically is like an intelligent connecting cell in a
central nervous system, routing and transmitting signals between stakeholders, between
departments, from the external market into development, and from marketing back into
the external world. With the role as a strategic router and conduit established, let us look
closer at the nature of this strategic role, as well as at some of the concrete
responsibilities and deliverables.
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Core Responsibilities
Bringing Software Product Management Into Focus
Product Management is a high level, strategic role. Many sources refer to the role
of Product Manager as the "CEO of the Product." Mark Chapman in The Product
Marketing Handbookfor Software defines the role of Software Product Management as
follows:
The product manager's primary role is to serve as the "voice of the
customer." In this role, a product manager is responsible for positioning,
pricing, and promoting the product, as well as managing the market
adoption and product life cycle. As such, the product manager "owns" the
product and is ultimately responsible for its release into the market and
long-term success. [11]
This definition seems to jibe with the industry interviews conducted. Philip
DesAutels, academic liaison for Microsoft, said this about his former PM role with the
company (Appendix B):
My role involved product that shipped internally. I was in charge of Web
Services technologies which would go into a variety of product lines. I
had to manage a series of these technologies, making sure they were in
sync with industry and customer's demands. I had to make sure the
developers were developing what the customers were asking for. Web
Services was an interoperability platform. Really a very technical
marketing role.
Scott Case of Atlas Solutions said this about his Product Management role there:
I own what happens to software in one of our four major product areas.
It's called the Atlas Media Console. This is a tool that allows traffickers
and planners at advertising agencies to set up, deliver, and track
performance of online advertising.. .as Product Manager, I decide what
features should be added to the product.... Here are customer needs,
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and I see that development can do maybe 10 of 300 desired features. I
go out and meet with the top 25 clients, I have met with 15-20 of the top
25 clients.
The Microsoft PM is dealing with internal customers and the Atlas PM is dealing
with external customers, but there is certainly a common thread in terms of the "voice of
the customer" role defined by Chapman. Chapman further delineates the roles of the
Product Manager as executing four main tasks:
" Developing the marketing requirements document (MRD) and related plans
and papers that document and validate your marketing and sales efforts.
* Managing the product feature list.
" Coordinating the activities of the different functional groups involved in
creating a new or updated software product.
" Participating in and/or running the launch and post-launch marketing activities
for a product. [11]
Deliverables of the Product Manager
Strategy
As we found in the section on the Blind Men and the Elephant, the main
deliverables of the PM are not physical, but strategic: making good tradeoffs, aligning
stakeholders, and promoting software usability to make it more consumable by the
market. As previously noted, the PM is like the CEO of the product. Other strategic
deliverables include management of product requirements (discussed thoroughly later in
the section on Requirements Engineering), schedule, release process, and beta
management. Some might claim the release process is an engineering task, but "product
management ultimately needs to work closely with engineering on this, and in some
cases, drives the meetings to discuss the bugs... .Eventually you are like a field doctor
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trying to perform triage." [12, p. 157] Only the PM fully understands which software
issues are critical to fix for a release.
The Marketing Requirements Document (MRD)
Certain physical documents help to achieve strategic goals, and can be
considered more concrete deliverables. These documents are by no means standardized
across companies. The main document sources agree on as a deliverable for the PM is
the Marketing Requirements Document, almost universally referred to as the MRD. This
document is like a strategic blueprint for the entire product: background, positioning,
target customer, competition, potential customers, high level functional requirements, and
key product value propositions. The MRD may also include information about supported
hardware and operating systems, cost constraints, sales and revenue projections, and a
high-level outline of product marketing activities. [12, p. 153]
MRD-Related Documents
Some companies include details of a planned marketing campaign, where others
document this separately. Documents related to the MRD include product contracts
(defined by Chapman as "[agreements] between marketing and development to reach a
series of product goals"), product roadmaps (discussed later in the Requirements
Engineering section), product requirements documents (PRD, specifying the product and
user experience in detail) and marketing message plans. Chapman also notes some
companies "don't believe in the MRD concept or believe the MRD should be nothing
more than a brief outline, though in our experience companies are eventually forced to
implement an MRD system out of sheer necessity." [11, p. 570]
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The Functional Requirements Document (FRD)
Usually, development writes the Functional Requirements Document or FRD.
The MRD describes the "what" and the FRD describes the "how" of a product. This
document specifies core functionality and may get into specific technologies planned to
implement the product. At some companies, this will be the lowest level documentation
produced before engineers actually begin writing code. At others, the lowest level will be
the Functional Specification describing technologies in detail and getting into some
architectural detail of implementation such as class diagrams. In this case, both the MRD
and FRD are considered "what" documents, the former from the marketing and the latter
from the engineering perspective. The Functional Specification then describes the
engineering "how" in detail.
Very technical PMs may be involved with the Functional Specification.
However, due to lack of term standardization, some companies that either do not produce
a Functional Specification or that combine the two documents refer to the FRD as the
Functional Specification. The PM's job is to make sure that the FRD (and / or Functional
Specification) correctly maps the requirements document in the MRD into software
functionality. [11, p. 570]
Product Management and Documentation
Software Product Management is about owning the strategy for a product, not
about producing documentation. The document set that should be produced varies
depending on the product, and even more so, on the size and culture of the organization
producing it. Various and sundry documents the PM may either produce or manage
include (but are not limited to) the product development schedule, legal documents for
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beta release, software documentation for beta and release, release notes, marketing
communications collateral, requests for proposals (RFPs), and feature wish lists. The PM
should gauge the amount of time and energy put into each document, and into
documentation overall, based on its potential impact into driving the product's market
success. Expending incredible amounts of energy on a meticulously maintained
documentation system is useless if the PM becomes too internally focused and loses track
of customer and market needs.
Demographics: Who Are Product Managers?
Before moving on to our exploration of Program Management, let us close this
section with a brief examination of the Product Manager's demographic profile both as a
person and in his corporate role. This section is drawn from a survey by Pragmatic
Marketing, which bills itself as the "Standard in Technology Product Management and
Marketing Education." [13]
According to the survey:
0 The average Product Manager is 36 years old
0 87% claim to be "somewhat" or "very" technical
* 33% are female, 67% are male
* 90% have completed college, 46% have completed a Master's program
In terms of reporting structure, the typical PM reports to a director in the product
management department, although many companies do not have a separate department
for this function. Reporting structure varies. The following percentages do not add up to
100% because more than one reporting relationship can be true of a single PM (for
instance, a PM can be in Marketing and report to a VP):
* 46% report to a director
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* 28% to a VP
* 5% report directly to the CEO
0 21% are in the Product Management department
0 15% are in the Marketing department
0 12% are in Development or Engineering
* 5% are in a sales department
Many PMs have a sales support role as part of their job, with 51% training sales
people and 44% going on sales calls. Only 16% report working with the press and
analysts, while 79% report monitoring development projects. 77% of PMs write
requirements. Technical demands of the role have increased since the dot com crash.
52% of PMs report writing detailed specifications, up from 29% in 2001. Average ratios
of Product Managers hired to products and other relevant employee headcount within the
firm are given in Figure 5.
Possibly the most interesting indication from these ratios is the one-to-one ratio
between Product Managers and Sales Engineers, quite telling from a corporate hiring
strategy perspective. Technical and inbound marketing responsibilities may be on the
increase, but Product Management comes from the Sales and Marketing side of the
corporation. 44% of Product Managers go out on sales calls. This raises a problem in
software product engineering: Software products are highly complex, technical, and
require much greater "inbound marketing" response-altering the product based on
customer needs-compared with traditional products such as soap, candles, and
toothpaste. This need sparked the creation of a role less bound to Sales and Marketing,
and more to Development or Engineering: the role of Program Manager, discussed next.
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Developers
Sales Persons 3.2
Products 3
Sales Engineers 1
Development Leads 0.8
Architects & Designers 0.6
Marketing Comm. 0.6
Marketing Managers 0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number Per Product Manager Employed
Figure 5 Product Manager Employee Ratios (Data from Pragmatic Marketing) 1131
Program Management
Microsoft realized in the 1980's that the job of Product Manager in high
technology products, including all pure software products, did not have a one-to-one
correspondence with the Proctor & Gamble role. They realized that in high technology,
Product Management spills over from a marketing function into being partly an
engineering function as well. As Proctor & Gamble pioneered the role and job of Product
Manager, so Microsoft pioneered the role and job of Program Manager. As Cusumano
& Selby note in Microsoft Secrets,
The first turning point was a decision in 1984 to set up testing groups
separate from development...The second, occurring about the same time,
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was when program management began to emerge as a function distinct
from product management and software development.[9, p. 36]
Later, a Microsoft program manager, Bruce Ryan, is quoted giving the key
responsibilities for program managers:
" the product's vision
" the written product specification
* the product schedule
" the product development process
" all implementation trade-offs
" coordination of the product development groups [9, p. 77]
Contrast this with Microsoft's description of Product Managers as "'MBAs' and
'snappy dressers [who] own their own homes" and have five areas of responsibility:
* oversee a "business"
* recognize and pursue market opportunities
* aggressively represent the customer in the product development process
* take responsibility for the trade-off between functionality and ship date
* take responsibility for the marketing and sales process [9, p. 89]
As of this writing, the Microsoft site describes the role of Technical Program
Manager as follows:
Driven to Succeed
Program Managers are customer focused, working to ensure that the
products Microsoft produces will delight users and enable them to do their
best. Program management is also an opportunity to flex technical
muscles: your technical decisions and direction are what drive products
and features through to completion.
Working across multiple groups with marketing and sales personnel on
the customer end, program managers translate customer requirements
into product features and create functional specifications. On the
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implementation end, they prioritize and deliver on those features, working
closely with key technical resources, such as software development,
testing, documentation, localization, tech support, and more.
Program Managers typically have a software development background.
This technical expertise is blended with evangelism, empathy, conflict
negotiation skills, and a passion for driving projects through to
completion. [14]
According to Microsoft academic liaison and former Product Manager Philip
DesAutels, Program Managers can be quite influential within Microsoft and become
more managerial and less technical at senior levels if they are involved with a large, vital
product suite such as Office. The title Program Manager is also somewhat overloaded to
some degree and can apply to a variety of different specialties. For instance, the Senior
Standards Program Manager of Corporate Standards is categorized as a "Legal and
Corporate Affairs" position.
The Program Management Grey Area
Earlier, we noted that Product Management is a somewhat difficult role to pin
down and define precisely. Program Management suffers from some of the same
ambiguities. This difficulty percolates up to recruiting issues:
There is no particular university degree that qualifies someone for a
program manager's job... .Gates himself observed: "Program
management is weird, because where do you recruit program managers?
What is the background for a program manager?" [9, p. 96]
Microsoft Secrets defines Program Managers as follows:
Program Managers have the broadest and most ill-defined set of
responsibilities... [they] tend to have backgrounds that combine a strong
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interest in design issues with some knowledge of or familiarity with
computer programming. [9, p. 97]
Yet a very different version of the role comes up in his newer book, The Business
of Software:
If managers of new projects wanted to move really fast... developers
usually took the lead in proposing features and writing up specification
outlines. In these cases, Microsoft program managers came on board
later and worked mainly on managing project schedules, writing up test
cases with testers in parallel with development, working with interface or
Web page designers, and building relationships with outside partners and
customers.[15, p. 160, italics mine]
This last-building outside relationships-sounds a lot like the role of a Product
Manager in serving as the customer's voice. Thus, the roles can overlap in some cases.
The fact is that both roles lay under the general umbrella of middle management and both
act as glue between what software engineers are actually implementing and what the
business is trying to accomplish. Most large software product companies today have both
Product and Program Managers, although startup- and medium-sized companies often do
not have Program Managers. In this case, the job of Program Management is split
between Development and Product Management. Virtually all software product
companies of any reasonable size do have Product Managers.
Conclusions on Product and Program Management
In general, the Program Manager position is a technical and feature-specific
permutation of the Product Management role. Created by Microsoft, the role has been
adopted by many other software companies. The overlap between the Product and
Program Management roles is as shown in Figure 6: both roles involve some two-way
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interaction between Engineering and Marketing, but Program Management is more
deeply embedded in and tightly bound to Engineering and product feature details, while
Product Management is more deeply embedded in Marketing. A Product Manager would
be more likely to prioritize features based on the potential added sales and market value
of the product, whereas a Program Manager would be thinking a lot more about how to
integrate specific features into the interface, and how to prioritize them based on ease or
difficulty of implementation.
Product Management
Engineering / R & D Marketing I Sales
Program Managernent
Figure 6 Relative Engineering / Marketing Overlap of Product / Program Management
This relationship seems to hold for Program Management positions in non-
Microsoft companies. For instance, Scott Case noted in his interview:
The Product Manager decides what features to add to the product. He or
she will work with one or two Program Managers to prioritize the features,
and will write a Business Requirements Document to give an idea what
should generally be in the release. The Program Managers work with
developers and Project Managers to kick back schedule estimates. As
needed, of course, there is a feedback loop to clarify and change course
during a project.
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The role of Product Manager is perhaps somewhat more strategic where as
Program Manager is more tactical, although flipping of this relationship is possible in a
company as large as Microsoft, in which the job of Program Manager has considerable
prestige. Bill Shelton claimed some coworkers were surprised when he moved to change
his role from Program to Product Manager, viewing it as a lateral move or even a slight
slip in prestige. There is a certain intangible prestige to being technical at Microsoft, and
Cusumano has noted that developers "walk taller" than other employees in the company,
which has formal and quite well-paying technical career tracks. Both roles share the
defining responsibility of cross functional team coordination to achieve technical and
market success of the product.
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IV. Struggle and Failure in Software Product
Management
An Extended Case Study: Netscape Navigator versus Internet
Explorer
In the military, one strategy to train both troops and their strategic commanders is
to play war-games. Past battles are also studied in detail by military strategists. The
purpose of this section is to view Product Management from a commercial war-games or
combat retrospective viewpoint. The moves, in some cases, were made by CEOs and not
directly by Product Managers, but PMs face precisely analogous strategic decisions,
although usually on a smaller and less public scale. One aspect of Product Management
this section illuminates, which we have not previously explored, is the importance of
company culture in the treatment of partners and customer-partners. PMs are often on
the front lines of these relationships and have a lot of influence over the tone of a
company's relationship with its partners.
One major motivation for this thesis was the collective works of business
historian Michael Cusumano, author of several books on software product innovation as
it relates to actual business value. The particular commercial combat retrospective we
use is derived from his book, Competing on Internet Time, co-authored by David B.
Yoffie. We attempt to extract the most poignant nuggets of wisdom from its over 300
pages with the advantage of writing with historical perspective in 2006, the Browser
Wars long past.
A lot of luck was involved in the creation of Netscape, and highly touted genius
Mark Andreessen stood, like most inventors, on the shoulders of giants. One giant in
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particular being Tim Berners-Lee who, for all intents and purposes, created the Web at
CERN. Andreessen created NCSA mosaic on top of the Berners-Lee-designed
infrastructure, and eventually became a founder of Netscape and its Netscape Navigator
browser. Navigator would eventually evolve into a suite of bundled applications and be
rechristened Communicator, but more on that later. Cusumano and Yoffie cover the
creation of the Netscape company in detail, and we will not discuss it in detail here. Pure
product management does not exist as an independent role until a company has reached a
certain critical mass and level of business infrastructure. Certainly Andreessen and co-
founder Jim Clark thought about aspects of the business we would consider product
management, but we are interested in businesses that have evolved to the level of being
able to support product management as an independent role.
Of course, Netscape evolved to this level very quickly. It is impossible to track in
any detail what the particular Product Managers within the company were doing, but we
can look at the entire company's product management policies based on the results of
their technology and partner initiatives. Competing on Internet Time also provides a few
peeks at what was going on with Netscape's product management internals. A high level
look follows at the lessons and ideas learned from Netscape's actions in Product
Management, both in capturing an open market and, later, in reaction to Microsoft's entry
into the browser market.
Company Culture Matters: Attitude is Part of the Product
Over the long haul, people problems tend to dominate technology problems in any
product with a mass market. In fact, most professors in MIT's Engineering Systems
Division seem to feel that human cultural problems dominate technology problems,
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period. Everything seems to point to NASA's cultural problems in the space shuttle
accidents, for instance. Netscape's company culture certainly had its issues, especially as
a business partner. Netscape was young, Netscape was hot, Netscape was a Wall Street
darling, and Netscape was arrogant.
Cusumano and Yoffie note, "The perception of arrogance was widespread. This
perception emerged fairly early in the company's history." An extended quotation from
Michael Dell, chairman of the now-dominant Dell Computer, is also given on this
subject:
Netscape was surprisingly arrogant for a company of their size and age
and didn't seem to aggressively pursue our business. It was just a
number of little things that sent the wrong signal to us. They didn't
appear to engage us very heavily in pursuing our business.
And...Netscape started to align itself with Oracle, IBM, and Sun to
support the network computer phenomenon, even though their bread and
butter counted on the PC. [16, p. 85]
Karen Richardson, who came on board Netscape as VP of strategic accounts, was
also quoted on the arrogance topic:
A lot of the arrogance had to do with the way partners, customers, and
potential partners were treated. Everything from do you show up to a
meeting on time to attitude. [16, p. 83]
Everyone knows the old adage, quoted to the point of cliche, that "power corrupts,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Microsoft is certainly not known as a humble
company and has oft been reviled for its perceived arrogance. Microsoft has been market
dominant to the point of monopoly and Netscape in the mid-1990's had quickly achieved
(what would turn out to be shockingly temporary) market dominance. Perhaps it is true
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that "market power corrupts, and absolute market power corrupts absolutely" when it
comes to a company's attitude and culture. Success breeds arrogance.
The problem with arrogance is that it causes incredible resentment in those on the
receiving end. In business, a company always needs its partners and customers to behave
in an economically rational fashion, or, through marketing, branding, image, and strategy,
to cause partners and customers to behave irrationally in the company's favor. Arrogance
can easily cause strategic partners and customers to behave in an economically irrational
way against the company: purchasing products or partnering with someone else even if
the arrogant company genuinely has a superior economic value proposition. Obviously,
this can have catastrophic long term impact on profitability. To make matters worse,
extreme arrogance, such as that exhibited by Microsoft, can radicalize a company's
enemies and galvanize them.
Arrogance at Microsoft
For instance, there is a large contingency of "disaffected software developers,"
users, businessmen, and competitors, which Cusumano and Yoffie refer to as the ABM
crowd: "Anybody But Microsoft." There is strong anecdotal evidence that Microsoft's
corporate arrogance along several dimensions has created this crowd, or at least made it
much larger and more cohesive than it would have been had Microsoft shown a touch of
humility or taken a more nurturing role. One might even speculate that the rapid spread
and adoption of Linux may have been significantly accelerated by deep resentment of
Gates & Company's domineering arrogance. Of course, with such a strong monopoly,
Microsoft has withstood a lot of arrogance. On the other hand, its growth on the stock
market and influence in the world have reached a plateau in recent years. How much of
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this can be attributed to the company's arrogance creating a vast horde of Microsoft
haters, all feeling like a part of La Resistance and often willing to go against their own
economic interests if they may bring down the arrogant giant over the long haul?
Arrogance at Netscape & "Mooning the Giant"
Netscape lacked Microsoft's monopolistic position and its arrogance may have
hurt the company much more deeply in the short term. Imagine the egregious magnitude
of the strategic error in coming across as arrogant to Michael Dell and failing to form a
partnership. Conversely, think of what might have happened if Netscape had
aggressively pursued Dell, played on Michael's fears of Microsoft's OS dominance
controlling his PC platform, and convinced him to bundle Netscape with every Dell PC
by the late 1990's? The market proved Dell did not need Netscape, but the outcome of
the Browser Wars might have been quite different had Netscape become tightly aligned
with Dell.
According to Christian mythology, "Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty
spirit before a fall."[ 17] Pride, or arrogance, may not destroy your business in the short
term, but it will surely make your competitors and perhaps even what could have been
your potential partners stick their feet out to trip you and see your business fall!
Company culture, it has been said, comes down from the top. A culture of
arrogance can certainly come down that way. In a case of arrogance versus arrogance,
Clark & Andreessen took a very poorly advised stance of arrogant defiance of Microsoft,
which Competing on Internet Time refers to as "mooning the giant." Clark repeatedly
referred to Microsoft as the "Death Star" and asked for trouble by claiming that
"Netscape was developing a full-fledged networked operating system that would make
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Windows unnecessary and outdated." Meanwhile, Andreessen was quoted as saying that
Netscape technology would relegate Microsoft's OS to being "a mundane collection of
not entirely debugged device drivers."[16, p. 105] David may have taken down Goliath
with a well-aimed slingshot bullet, but Andreessen's PR strategy was akin to simply
hurling insults at the giant. The giant was more than capable of crushing David in this
scenario, and, of course, Microsoft went on to make mincemeat of Netscape's market
share.
Regardless, Clark and Andreessen's arrogant attitude toward Microsoft may have
encouraged company arrogance in general. Netscape lacked what might be called
strategic humility. In managing even a very successful software product, it makes sense
to always be respectful and reasonably humble in dealing with partners, potential
partners, and customers-even those who may not seem important in the short term.
Judo Strategy
Cusumano and Yoffie discuss Netscape's competitive strategy in the chapter of
the same name, focusing on Judo as a driving metaphor. Much of the book references
this metaphor, and it is worth repeating the four fundamental tenants of struggle, which
applies both to company and product management:
* Move rapidly to uncontested ground in order to avoid head-to-head combat.
* Be flexible and give way when attacked directly by superior force.
* Exploit leverage that uses the weight and strategy of opponents against them.
* Avoid sumo competitions, unless you have the strength to overpower your
opponent. [16, p. 90]
We will touch on each one of these concepts. For coverage in depth, the book is
an excellent case study for any software Product Manager to read, especially in the brave
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new world in which nearly all new enterprise and consumer software products are either
Internet-centric or at least Internet-enabled.
Uncontested Ground
"Shoot, Move, and Communicate"
This quote from former Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale, taken from the marine
infantry's standing orders, reflects his philosophy of having Netscape be a nimble
business combatant against the larger but less flexible Microsoft. The idea is to avoid
getting pinned down by a competitor in a rough head-on battle, such as a direct firefight
against Microsoft. Of course, as seen above with the "mooning the giant" tendency
Netscape had, they were not always consistent with this philosophy. However, they did
outflank and outmaneuver the competition in browser space, and beat out several smaller
competitors. If the first volley of rounds was creating and releasing the browser itself,
the Netscape platoon quickly moved to fire at the competition from a different angle:
they took greater advantage of the online ability to download the browser than did the
competition.
"Free, but not free"
Netscape continuously altered the rules of the market for competitive advantage.
Product pricing is an important part of PM, and Netscape fired at competitors from the
pricing position with an innovative pricing strategy: "Netscape browsers were free for
anyone to download on a 90-day trial basis, free for students and educational institutions,
and $39 (later raised to $49) for everyone else."[16, p. 99] By contrast, one competitor
named Spry, kept "firing" from their position on retail shelves, convinced that the old
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retail model and dial up Internet was a solid position from which to fight a war of
attrition. Spry had an early entrant position over Netscape, but their lack of
maneuverability and continued focus on shrink-wrap proved a tragic mistake in Product
Management for them.
Limits of Movement
Moving too much in search of uncontested territory "can confuse customers and
undermine a company's strategic credibility." It can "look like inconsistency.. .lack of
focus and a lack of commitment." Andy Grove, Intel's chairman, said,
The battle between Microsoft and Netscape can be described as a
guerilla war against an occupying army. Netscape originally was going
after browsers, then going after consumers, and then they changed their
strategy to corporations.. .the problem is, they're running out of space,
munitions, and food.
The idea was that the constant strategy changes were raising serious questions
about Netscape's ability to commit to a strategy and execute. This further jeopardized a
company already shaky in the area of partner relationships. To close this discussion, we
will quote former Netscape employee Alex Edelstein, who told Cusumano and Yoffie,
I'm going to strangle the next person who tells me, "We have to change
the rules, Alex, that's the only way we are going to beat these guys."
Because that is a very valuable tool, but you cannot use it as a crutch, as
a replacement, as a surrogate for execution.[16, p. 104]
Be Flexible
Aesop's "Fable of the Oak and the Reeds" epitomizes the Judo strategy of being
flexible, elucidated to members of Generation X in the pop culture by the character of
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Paul Atreides (played by Kyle MacLachlan) in Frank Herbert's "Dune", who thinks
(aloud via voiceover), "I will bend like a reed in the wind!"
For better or for worse, the best and most shocking example of flexibility in the
Browser Wars came not from Netscape but from Microsoft. Everyone in the Silicon
Valley eventually heard about Gates' famous memo from 1995, "The Internet Tidal
Wave." In a major break from previous strategy, Gates proclaimed, "Now I assign the
Internet the highest level of importance. The Internet is the most important single
development to come along since the IBM PC was introduced in 1981." [16, p. 108]
Microsoft's Master Stroke of Framing and Flexibility
Flexibility
It is easy to say, in retrospect, that any fool could see that the Internet as a non-
proprietary platform would rule the world by 1995, but this is not necessarily true.
Microsoft had massive resources and power, and an economic interest in the proprietary
Microsoft Network, which Gates essentially threw over a cliff when he decided to use an
embrace and extend strategy for the Net. At a very high level, this may have been one of
the single most brilliant, or at least economically most important, Product Management
decisions in the history of software. In terms of visionary accuracy, the insight behind
this decision was perhaps only superseded by Gates' original notion in the 1970's that the
software, not the hardware, was the key product. Within a week after Gates said, "We're
hard-core about the Internet," Netscape's valuation had fallen by 28 percent.
Framing
Beyond flexibility, Gates' speech was brilliant from a public relations standpoint.
They chose December 7th, the anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, as the date to
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speak with the press. In the Harvard Business School experimental course, Strategic
Reasoning Laboratory, Professor Giovanni Gavetti teaches about the importance of
framing a problem in terms an audience will understand, and in terms that the audience
will not resist. Often viewed as the "Evil Empire" or a big corporate bully, Microsoft has
not been a master of good PR. However, on that day in 1995, Bill Gates gave a masterful
analogy:
I realized this morning that December 7th is kind of a famous day.. .And I
was trying to think if there were any parallels to what was going on
here.. .the most intelligent comment that was made on that day wasn't
made on Wall Street, or even by any...analyst; it was actually Admiral
Yamamoto, who observed that he feared they had awakened a sleeping
giant. [16, p. 109]
This analogy triggers the "frame", in the Gavetti sense, of Microsoft not as a
bully, but as a powerful yet heroic and patriotic giant being hurt unawares by an angry
and aggressive, but weaker upstart. All but Microsoft's most adamant enemies could not
help feeling a vague sense of patriotic sympathy with Microsoft on hearing the Netscape /
Microsoft battle framed in this way. Even dyed-in-the-wool Microsoft haters could not
avoid having the frame triggered and a momentary confusion of feelings about the Evil
Empire: that is just how the human brain works.
Gavetti noted in his class that all of HBS, driven by the case method, is based on
analogy. Framing is critical in Product Management as elsewhere in business. The most
important reading for the class, in terms of framing, was a book by George Lakoff, Don't
Think of an Elephant. (This is unrelated to the Blind Men and the Elephant parable
discussed earlier.) Every PM who faces framing product and company issues for the
press should read the first 35 pages of this book. As an example of the power of framing,
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Lakoff notes how important it is to have a good frame and how even attacking an
opponent's frame can work against you:
When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame. Richard Nixon found that
out the hard way. While under pressure to resign during the Watergate
scandal, Nixon.. .stood before the nation and said, "I am not a crook."
And everybody thought about him as a crook. [18]
Most Product Managers must communicate with the press: never underestimate
the power of framing!
Exploit Leverage
Cross Platform versus Planned Obsolescence
Netscape found weaknesses in Microsoft's strategy in that the larger company had
a large installed base of legacy products. Microsoft relied partially on a regimen of
"planned obsolescence" and its new Internet Explorer product would not immediately run
on PCs with older Windows versions in many corporations. IT managers in companies
tend to upgrade much less often than home users for reasons of cost and operations
headaches. Barksdale exploited this by speaking of the "UNIXification of Windows" and
Netscape took the strategy of supporting the whole installed PC base.
This was, temporarily, an effective strategy and slowed down Netscape's browser
share loss. However, as Cusumano and Yoffie point out, "The weakness of Netscape's
strategy is that the half-life of DOS and Windows 3.1 is finite: Over time more and more
companies will migrate.. .points of leverage do not last forever, especially when
competing on Internet time."
Netscape also attempted to use cross-platform technology as leverage for their
products, especially Java technologies. Product Managers beware, though: Going cross-
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platform always sounds good when going up against a highly proprietary competitor, but
has extremely high hidden technical cost. "Cross-platform products pose technical
challenges that can lead to lower programming productivity and weak product
performance compared to platform-specific products." Netscape never did do a
successful complete rewrite in Java. Bob Lisbonne, Netscape's V.P. of the Client
Product Division, said,
The 6.0 project, which was code-named Xena and was basically a new
Communicator [Netscape's 2 nd generation browser] all written in Java,
has been shelved. And that's been shelved primarily for technical
reasons. The reality was that Java.. .was just not yet up to the task of
implementing a product of that complexity. [16, p. 193]
Mark Andreessen himself said, "I just didn't kill it soon enough....And 6.0 turned
into rocket science, and it was driving me nuts." An in depth study is beyond our scope
here, but in the author's experience, planned (or fortuitous) obsolescence strategies have
dominated over pure cross platform and backward compatible approaches in software and
hardware product histories, at least in terms of profitability.
"Open, But Not Open"
In terms of open interfaces and Internet protocols, Netscape did a fairly good job
of exploiting leverage and framing to paint Microsoft as the evil proprietary alternative
and themselves as the "guardian of greater 'openness"'. This strategy was intended to
appeal to what was known in the Silicon Valley as the ABM crowd, who wanted
Anybody But Microsoft to win any technology war and wanted to use products from,
well, Anybody But Microsoft. This was good positioning, or framing as Professor
Gavetti would say, but behind the PR framing lay the truth that Netscape would offer
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"very subtle features that are proprietary or difficult to copy." In one of the more
important insights of Competing on Internet Time, the following "open secret" is
revealed:
In fact, the dirty secret of the computer industry is that everyone is "open,
but not open"; they differ only in degree. Every computer company has
proprietary pieces in its solutions, while every company in the industry
claims to be "open," including Microsoft and IBM. [16, p. 133]
There are two kinds of frames: Frames that match the underlying facts, but
creatively, and frames that don't. The latter kind can be powerful and manipulative
toward a desired end, but are also subject to backfiring. The reality of Netscape's "open,
but not open" strategy became apparent and slowly shifted customer perception to blur
the distinction between their "champion of openness" stance and the perception of
Microsoft as highly proprietary. Product Managers should beware of risking their
integrity with customers by using frames which do not match the facts! Fact-matching
frames are like white magic: powerful, positive, and rarely troublesome. Disinformation
frames are like black magic, even more powerful for manipulation, but prone to turning
negative and, depending on the level of the mismatch, extremely dangerous to a product's
(or suite of products', or a company's) long term reputation.
Overpowering with Sumo Competition
Cusumano and Yoffie give Microsoft credit for one more judo move, in giving
away Internet Explorer. This goes too far in giving Microsoft kudos for its judo. The
ultimate market-crushing hammer of the incumbent heavy in any industry is to drop
prices to squeeze out a new competitor. One of a myriad of possible examples is the
Harvard Business case dealing with Braniff versus Southwest Airlines: essentially,
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Braniff tried to crush Southwest Airlines through pure price wars, and Southwest
responded with a truly brilliant judo move. Southwest framed Braniff as the big price
war bully, appealing to the public's sense of fairness. The exact move will not be
revealed here lest the HBS case mafia comes after the author, but the move was true
business judo, and it worked.
The point is, Competing on Internet Time unfairly claims, "Microsoft was using
Netscape's weight against it. Netscape became caught in a classic judo move." The
move was classic, all right, but it was a classic bullying tactic by a heavyweight opponent
with superior capital and an operating system monopoly. From later in the book:
"Netscape management seemed immobilized by Microsoft's 'free IE' judo move."
Again, Netscape may have been immobilized, but clearly by a sumo move, not by a judo
move. Judo has nothing to do with Microsoft's brute force attack on Netscape's market
share by using Internet Explorer as the ultimate Internet loss-leader product: a browser
given away free. The Silicon Valley watched in horrified fascination as Microsoft
assaulted Netscape with this ultimate sumo attack, pushing against the boundaries of
business ethics: was Microsoft leveraging one monopoly to gain another?
History seems to support our dissenting view. Cusumano and Yoffie themselves
quote one Microsoft representative as saying in public, "Our intent is to flood the market
with free Internet software and squeeze Netscape until they run out of cash." They do
acknowledge at the end of Competing on Internet Time,
But Gates and company were too greedy and too tough when it came to
winning market share in the browser wars. In winner-take-all
environments, firms can gain so much market power and market share
that they have special obligations under antitrust laws.. .you cannot use
your monopoly power to hurt a competitor in another market. [16, p. 319]
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Why Microsoft is given credit for a judo move here, when giving away Internet
Explorer was clearly a sumo move at best, and an illegal monopoly-leveraging sumo
move at worst, remains puzzling. Perhaps it is an example of being seduced by one's
own frame: the driving frame of the book is the judo contest. In an effort to remain
balanced, trying not to paint Microsoft as a sumo-centric bully, Cusumano and Yoffie
perhaps tried to fit more of Microsoft's strategy into the judo frame than actually merited
by the business colossus of Redmond.
Marketing Warfare in Product Management
It is evident from the Netscape / Microsoft browser wars that all "four P's" of
marketing-Product, Price, Positioning, and Promotion (they had to come up somewhere
in a work involving marketing)-come strongly into play for modem Software Product
Management, particularly in a contentious space. Netscape waltzed into an open market
with an excellent new product, startling Microsoft, which had left open a market power
vacuum. Microsoft spent egregious sums creating their own product, using an essentially
unlimited budget and quickly coding up what turned out to be a solid, modular, decent
alternative. Both companies had compelling products. Without a compelling product, no
amount of Product Management can make a company a market winner beyond a very
short "hype window".
Netscape competed on price with a unique new "free but not free" model also
involving positioning, but their market was eventually destroyed when Microsoft
detonated the thermonuclear pricing war device of giving away their version of an
equivalent product. Positioning Netscape Communicator as a downloadable solution
helped Netscape win over Spry in the short term, and they later used positioning judo
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through a cross platform strategy, compatible with more versions of Windows than
Microsoft's own Internet Explorer. Judo moves only are effective for a few seconds of
market time, and eventually Microsoft's brand name and possibly illegal arm-twisting of
PC clone makers effectively steamrollered over Netscape for positioning dominance.
Of course, both companies madly promoted their product, with Netscape
benefiting from first mover advantage, a much-hyped IPO, and the executive celebrity
duo of Andreessen and Clark. Bill Gates has worldwide, long lasting celebrity, also, and
Microsoft's market dominance of the operating system allowed them to win the key
promotion battle for icons on the Windows desktop. The battle was truly an epic one
crossing business and legal boundaries, with Microsoft ultimately the victor, but also
ending up in court for antitrust violations. Product Managers, especially those with
similar outbound responsibilities, can expect to fight similar battles in their careers.
There is no formula for winning these battles, but shrewd PMs will focus first on having
excellent product, strategize on all "four P's", and keep an eye out for leverage
opportunities using marketing judo.
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V. Software Project Management
Product and Program Management are distinct roles from Project (or
Development) management in most software companies, but neither is completely
insulated from the details of project management. Program Managers are intimately
involved in the tactical details of developing new features, including working with
Development Managers on project schedules to decide what feature set can be developed
for new product versions. As for Product Managers, 79% surveyed in 2005 reported the
responsibility of "monitoring development projects" as part of their jobs. [13] Thus, a
study of project management methodology is necessary to understand fully the role of the
Product and Program Manager in relation to the software development team. Since
plenty of literature exists on project management, we will only survey the major methods
in use today, briefly critiquing how each might affect software architecture and company
culture.
Waterfall Model
The first traditional software development methodology, the Waterfall Model, is
linear and inflexible. In the unlikely event a Product Manager is dealing with a pure
Waterfall Model shop, it will be extremely important to define all requirements with
absolute precision and an ironclad contract of execution. The Waterfall Model (Figure 7)
can be described as "Big Bang" project management: the system and software
requirements are the seed of the software product universe, and six months to two years
later explode into a perfectly completed software product. This generally does not
happen, as inevitably upstream changes are required. It is extremely expensive to make
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"upstream changes" in this model. Probably the U.S. Department of Defense is one of
the only organizations left using this model in its purest form, and even they are
beginning to use more iterative methods in new projects.
System
requiremet
Figure 7 Waterfall Model (Source: http://www.serverpeak.com/images/waterfal.gi)
Spiral Model
The Spiral Model (Figure 8) is perhaps the most important technological
innovation for modeling the software process after the Waterfall Model, which is simply
not sufficient to capture the need for the many iterations necessary to produce most
software products. Most modem software project management methodologies derive
from the Spiral Model. One of the main differences between modem methods is how
"tight" the turns of the spiral are. A sync-and-stabilize company like Microsoft might
have spirals that revolve in a matter of weeks, whereas some of the more avant-garde
methods can undergo an entire turn in a day or possibly even a fraction of a day.
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Some of these newer methods are sort of "spiral waterfalls", and it is possible to
combine the two methodologies by creating bite-sized linear project sub-plans and then
spiraling them together to allow for iterations. Extreme Programming is a good
approximation of this combination (see below), with little two week waterfalls, but the
collection of waterfall model processes is more iterative and spiral in nature.
Not all phases shown in the figure are used in all versions of the Spiral Model in
industrial use. The common feature is an iterative approach. The important note for the
Software Product Manager is that this model involves creating successive prototypes, or
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incremental releases, of the product. Thus it is much easier to inject requirements
changes into this process as customer requirements evolve or are better understood,
because the spiral will swing around to a new level of requirements input and validation.
This is no excuse for not carefully formulating requirements at the beginning of a project,
however, and repeatedly injecting serious requirements changes at all angles of the spiral
is probably the most efficient way to drastically reduce or even eliminate a project's
chances of success.
Agile Software Development
Agile Software Development sounds like a consulting company but, according to
one article in Computer by IEEE, it is actually a collective term for multiple new project
management methods for software including Extreme Programming, Crystal Methods,
Lean Development, Scrum, and Adaptive Software Development. All of them are
modifications of the Spiral Model. These methods, called agile methods, are good news
for a Product Manager with changing requirements from customers. In today's business
world, eliminating change early in the development process causes unresponsiveness to
business concerns and therefore causes PM difficulties. Reducing the cost of reactive
change throughout the software project is the goal of agile methods. Working code is
emphasized over documentation, and there are several other preferred methods
emphasizing individuals, interactions, customer collaboration, and change
responsiveness. Agile methods don't involve inclusive rules but generative rules, a
"minimum set" of behaviors to devise appropriate practices for special situations. Intense
interactions between team members are emphasized. The goal is to produce software that
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actually meets customer requirements and workplaces that "aren't described in Dilbert
cartoons." [19]
Extreme Programming (or XP)
Extreme Programming is perhaps the most well known and fashionable of the
new wave of agile methods as of this writing in 2006. One introductory article by Robert
C. Martin elucidates the basic tenet of Extreme Programming: frequent feedback. [20]
The "Two Week Plan" is at the core of this model. Instead of a six month software
product plan which forms one large waterfall model of development, XP is more spiral-
like in having "mini-waterfall" plans of two weeks in duration. Then all these mini-
waterfalls are spiraled together: the approach is to incorporate the feedback from the past
two weeks into the next two weeks, and iterate.
Some tenants of XP, such as the requirement to have all code literally written with
two people at a desk, seem impractical. This policy goes completely against the solitary
nature of programmers, who like to go off on their own to do the "real work". Since very
few programmers have exactly the same skill level, speed, and style of hacking, this two-
to-a-desk model-if forced-would most often degenerate into a tutorial / training
session for one programmer and a drain / annoyance on the more advanced programmer.
The two-to-a-desk model may sound good in a Project Management book, but rarely
happens in industry due to cost and personality issues. However, the basic idea of
reducing the trust (or risk) horizon to two weeks instead of six months is a good one. The
spirit of Extreme Programming is to try to increase communication and build trust by
delivering features in smaller time increments. A Product or Program Manager operating
in a corporation using some variant of XP has the advantage of being able to inject
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requirements modifications quite often. This is helpful, but there is a dark side: this
method lends itself to drifting away from the original requirements as programmers and
Project Managers continually revisit requirements and may have a tendency to dumb
down those requirements which are hard to implement, while expanding on features that
are easier to implement. Thus, in this model, the Product Manager will incur more
communication effort in keeping the development teams on target with original
requirements, but will also find teams to be highly responsive to needed changes.
Scrum
Scrum is perhaps right behind XP in popularity. According to the home page for
Scrum---http://www.controlledchaos.com-Scrum is "A variation on Sashimi, an 'all at
once' approach to software engineering. Both Scrum and Sashimi are suited best to new
product development rather than extended software development." Figure 9 gives a
rough depiction of the development cycle. Interestingly, some companies do use Scrum
for continued development.
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Scott Case, a Product Manager interviewed for this thesis, works for Atlas
Solutions in the Internet advertising industry. The core software system serves ad
banners. "Development leads use Scrum methodology, and work together," he said.
"Scrum meetings are internal, but then there is a once-a-day 15 minute meeting of team
leads."
The People Factor
One article by Cockburn & Highsmith advocating agile methods emphasizes the
importance of people in agile software development. Placing people physically closer,
replacing documents with whiteboard discussions, and improving the team's
"amicability" are all encouraged. Important summary slogans include "people trump
process" and "politics trump people"-people of talent can work their way through any
process, but process will not make incompetent people perform; and corporate politics,
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including inadequate executive support, can kill any project regardless of the talent of the
front line people involved. [21]
The issue with these so-called agile development methods is that they seem to
have been created in a psychological vacuum. Programmers are private people. They are
willing to be a little closer, spend a bit more time in meetings, but they view it as
punishment to be forced to sit in a group all day long. Some ideas from agile methods
make sense, but others will be proven by history to be the outcome of a 5-7 year "manic
episode" in the history of software development. For instance, the Highsmith &
Cockburn article (published in 2001 and probably written before the true catastrophic
nature of the crash was fully apparent) states, "replace documents with talking in person
and at whiteboards." This is ridiculous. People are going to talk and use whiteboards
anyway in a functional organization, and it might make sense to reduce documentation,
but it is ludicrous to ditch all documentation. Organizational memory vanishes in this
scenario. This kind of attitude was indicative of the times: "We don't have time for
documentation!" was the prevailing attitude, as over-funded startups snorted the free
flowing metaphorical cocaine of excessive Venture Capital and made sloppy rushes to
market.
Fashionable Agile Methods: Programmers as Cattle?
Agile methods have a catch: some of the ideas are repugnant to talented
programmers. For instance, the very idea of forcing software engineers, who tend to be
thoughtful, highly intelligent individualists, into "barrier-free collocated teams" might
sound good on paper but totally ignores the psychology of what it means to decide to
become a software engineer. Many startup companies got ahold of these agile methods
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and used the "barrier free" idea to take away any privacy a given programmer might have
at work. Programmers were forced, like pigs in a pen, to sit within smelling distance of
each other at long tables-sometimes no bigger than card tables, and in the worst of the
dot coms, actually card tables-all in the name of some project management fad. To
many who experienced this methodology as software engineers, including the author, the
open area "bullpen" concept came across as a lame excuse by management to deprive
workers of personal space and privacy. The policy created a Dilbert-esque, oppressive
office atmosphere. Abusive aspects of these project management fads ran rampant in
many companies which failed. Even Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Online, which used a
bastardized version of XP, no longer exists today. It is ironic that the Cockburn &
Highsmith article subtitled The People Factor, shows a complete neglect and ignorance
of the psychology of the workers performing the projects. [21]
Many if not most software engineers are uncomfortable in large groups for long
periods of time: denying them personal space at work is tantamount to punishment.
Promoting greater levels of interaction is important, but Product Managers should be
prepared to find a very stressful, touchy atmosphere if working in companies that go so
far as to advocate the bullpen approach. By contrast, it is quite telling that many of the
best (or at least most profitable) software companies, including Microsoft, provide
developers with individual offices or at least cubicles.
Companies that truly need to use bullpens usually have systems that either have,
or are heading toward "catastrophic coupling." Atlas Solutions, for instance, has a high
availability ad serving system. On maintaining and developing this system, Scott Case
said,
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Tradeoffs involve "keeping the lights on" versus innovation. We're
dealing with 110,000 ads per second. 6 billion ads a day. Our SLA
(software license agreement) says we must respond within 2
milliseconds... New features have a deeply cascading effect into the
system, which is tricky considering you have to keep the thing up
24x7... Most of the five teams are in Seattle. We use a Bullpen style area
and XP-style pair programming.
There are two possibilities here. Managers at Atlas Solutions would certainly
argue that the bullpen approach is simply necessary for such a system. Speaking
hypothetically, the system may actually seem to need the bullpen approach because of its
tightly coupled, relatively inflexible architecture innately difficult to modify. Atlas's
product architecture was not evaluated, but certainly there are many organically grown
and tightly coupled commercial software architectures in the field.
Such systems could be said to have "tar-baby architectures." The more tightly
coupled the architecture, the more developers have to be in one place to modify anything
or to add features. Ironically, the more people are in one place, the greater the ability to
modify the tar-baby architecture with even more esoteric, tightly coupled hacks: the tar
baby grows even bigger and more developers become "stuck" to it (need to be in the
same place to modify it effectively). Thus system size and complexity slowly increases.
The bullpen grows. Individual developers have an increasingly more difficult time
adding changes. The interview with Scott Case lends anecdotal evidence to this theory:
There is one outsourced development team in India, but the software
modules must be very well defined.. .the outsourcing hasn't worked out
well. We seem to have difficulties making outsourcing work; it is very
hard to carve off modular tasks.
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Subjectively, software shops using bullpens are not particularly pleasant places to
work, at least as a software engineer. Objectively, there is clear anecdotal evidence here
(and there are many other examples) that bullpens may function as substitute-cheap in
the short term and prodigiously expensive in the long term-for modular, well designed
software architecture lending itself to clean division of labor. Bullpens may even
facilitate an increase in architectural coupling and complexity over time: a detailed study
worthy of its own thesis may be in order. Meanwhile, Product Managers should consider
use of a pure bullpen development strategy to be a yellow flag: the ability to inject new
features into systems developed this way may be quite high in the short term, but over the
long haul, such shops expose themselves to high employee turnover and brittle, tightly
coupled software which becomes increasingly difficult to modify or even outsource
functionality enhancements. Here, there be strangler trees!
Skepticism on Agile Methods and Software Architecture
Agile methods are quite fashionable and popular in the software industry at the
moment, and are certainly here to stay for the foreseeable future. Some important
thinkers are adamantly opposed to this approach to software. MIT CSAIL professor
Daniel Jackson had this to say on the subject (entire interview transcript in Appendix C):
PROFESSOR JACKSON: You have to remember that the software
industry, by and large, is extraordinarily conservative. Which is very
surprising for a bunch of people who consider themselves radicals.
JOHN HEMPE: Define conservative in this context.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: They don't want to change the way they do
things. They want to rely on, sort of, lift your finger and feel the wind.
They don't want to consider the possibility that computers could help you
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design software. You look, for example, at the astonishing vehemence
with which Extreme Programming has attacked the idea of design.
JOHN HEMPE: Yes.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: It is not the method. It's the idea that you
could design a system. It's deeply unfashionable to suggest the idea that
a system could be designed.
JOHN HEMPE: True. These methods like Agile, Scrum, XP, these tight
iterative methods--
PROFESSOR JACKSON: What they're confusing is the principle of risk
management in which you don't want to make decisions for which you
don't have information, versus the idea that even when you're capable of
making predictions and good decisions you should just blunder ahead
anyway and pay whatever price it costs to fix it.
What they essentially do is all the design in the code, which is an
extraordinarily expensive way to do things. In the face of all their
criticisms of formal methods, it's amazing how much work these people
are prepared to do.
Nonetheless, legions of programmers work using these methods, perhaps because
agile methods leverage their core skill: to write code. Myriad managers trying to keep
some control over chaotic software projects love the methods because they at least allow
quick response to ever-changing requirements. We will delve deeper into this topic in the
section on Requirements Engineering.
Capability Maturity Model for Software
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Agile Methods is Capability Maturity
Model-style project management. CMM is perhaps the most famous example of an
attempt to organize all software management.
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In November 1986, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), with
assistance from the MITRE Corporation, began developing a process
maturity framework that would help organizations improve their software
process.. .The CMM presents sets of recommended practices in a
number of key process areas that have been shown to enhance software
process capability. The CMM is based on knowledge acquired from
software process assessments and extensive feedback from both
industry and government. The Capability Maturity Model for Software
provides software organizations with guidance on how to gain control of
their processes for developing and maintaining software and how to
evolve toward a culture of software engineering and management
excellence.[22]
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Figure 10 Levels of the Capability Maturity Model [221
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CMM focuses on the immaturity / maturity of a software organization's software
development management. Five major levels of maturity are defined. Level 1 is total
immaturity and Level 5 can take up to a decade to achieve. The defined levels include
Initial, Repeatable, Defined, Managed, and Optimizing, as shown in Figure 10. The
model asserts that these levels must be achieved in sequential order because each level of
maturity uses the previous one as its foundation. Key features include commitment to
performance, ability to perform, activities performed, measurement and analysis, and
implementation verification.
The CMM model is noble enough in intention and certainly cannot be condemned
as a method unilaterally. Many Indian IT outsourcing outfits, including Infosys, are
certified CMM Level 5. A Product or Program Manager looking into outsourcing
features of a product might want to take note of whether the company under
consideration has CMM certification. Detractors of the model would note that an
organization can take a shallow "test passing" approach to becoming certified at
successive CMM levels, achieving high levels without becoming top quality software
producers or service providers.
Software development is such an immature discipline that there is a great danger
in "official" certifications of such models as CMM, which can still very much be
considered developmental, if not experimental. A company can spend hundreds of
thousands or millions of dollars being certified at a high level of CMM for marketing
reasons, but ending up with a checkbox-filling, letter-of-the-law mentality that adds
process for the sake of process, unnecessary layers of bureaucracy, and a net slowdown
of software development. An advocate of CMM might argue that the model is so good
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that a software organization is forced to be better if it's certified at a high CMM level
even if it is just following the letter of the law.
The Immaturity of CMM
An article by Bach points out that CMM is funded by the US Department of
Defense, and makes the assertion that CMM cannot "legitimately claim to be a natural or
essential representation of software processes." He is concerned that CMM could be
dangerous if too much focus is put on certification via CMM as a marketing tool, or as he
puts it, "a whitewash that obscures the true dynamics of software engineering,
suppress[ing] alternative models." [23] CMM is notably unpopular amongst highly
nimble software companies such as those producing shrink-wrap software, and is unheard
of in Silicon Valley Internet startups, unless perhaps they are outsourcing some feature
development to a CMM-certified shop in India.
CMM itself claims not to be a "silver bullet" a la Fred Brooks, but with such
heavy government funding its proponents tend to behave contrary to this humble posture.
Process trumps people in CMM, according to Bach, but Cockburn and Highsmith assert
in their Agile article that people actually trump process, and Bach is in their camp. [21]
Software problems are simply too complicated to be codified as process: you can't make
a human being a good chess player simply by giving him a good process, asserts Bach,
and neither can you make him a good software developer.
The much tiered structure of CMM itself is problematic, according to Bach: the
driving force is just to get to the next level. Defect prevention is primarily a Level 5
issue. This could possibly cause an organization obsessed with CMM certification for
government contracts or general marketing to become blind to the need for careful defect
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prevention regardless of the level of CMM maturity. Perhaps the most damning assertion
of all Bach makes is that CMM stifles innovation through its slavish devotion to tiered
process, through its ignoring of innovation or personal mastery as factors in the software
organization. CMM is seductive to managers because it gives an easy formula to make
some sort of process to the incredibly messy act of team software development. Blind
management via CMM could steamroller blindly over personal creativity.
Michael Cusumano points out in his book, Business of Software, that Japanese
companies have taken a zero-defect approach to software, but that this limits their
commercial viability-although the approach makes for great embedded systems
software in certain hardware devices.[15] CMM could degrade a software shop to the
Japanese "software factory" level: it might work to slowly produce high quality
embedded systems software, but could slow an organization down far too much to be
viable in the commercial software market. At worst, a slavish devotion to CMM as a
heavily funded, well known measuring stick useful as a marketing claim could gut out the
innovative soul of a development organization and send the passionate and master coders
running for new opportunities in less stifled shops. However, it at least advocates
discipline and continuous improvement and is less likely to produce the "tar-baby
architectures" and unpleasant working conditions (such as bullpen programming) of
supposedly agile methods taken to extremes.
Process, Culture, and Project Management
Now that we've looked at both ends of the spectrum, extreme Agile methods and
ultra-conservative CMM, let us pop up to a philosophical level. People, not project
methods, ultimately do the work. In his article, Enough About Process: What We Need
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are Heroes, Bach talks about the "three P's" for software managers: People, Problem,
and Process. His basic argument is that process is peripheral rather than central to the
development of excellent software. He concludes that the "heroic efforts of a dedicated
team" are central to the success of a software project, which is certainly true. He believes
that people accept roles more readily than tasks, and that people need to see that their
tasks have meaning in terms of creating solutions that solve problems. [24]
People do accept roles more readily than tasks. The amount of structure placed
on top of these roles in the form of formal software product management methodology is
a key strategic decision based on individual company culture, as well as the product type
under development. Department of Defense contractors may actually be forced to use
CMM, while many Silicon Valley startups use no formal software project management
process or "wing it" using a few Gantt charts generated using Microsoft Project. A lack
of project management structure can lead to poor requirements organization and brittle
product architecture, while heavy processes at large companies can degrade into slavish
bureaucracy, slowing software project progress to the pace of molasses in November.
Product, Program, and Project Managers must realize that "software engineering"
has a long way to go before it is truly reduced to an engineering discipline. Completely
defined processes, such as those used in hardware manufacturing, simply do not work to
create software products. Bill Gates has been quoted as saying, "A great lathe operator
commands several times the wage of an average lathe operator, but a great writer of
software code is worth 10,000 times the price of an average software writer." With such
wide variability in individual productivity and the difficulty of predicting progress in the
experimental and creative act of writing code, no single prepackaged process can meet a
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company's project management needs. Processes must be tailored to company culture
and to the product being developed. Continuous monitoring, as well as continual
openness to process adaptation, are also vital keys to achieving project management
success.
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VI. Requirements Engineering
The Product Management Frontier
Now that we have explored Product and Program Management from the
perspectives of history, economic environment, directly in terms of the jobs and roles, an
extended case study, and the tightly intertwined cross functional role of project
management, let us look to the future before we conclude. Where is Product and
Program Management going from 2006 into the future? Requirements Engineering is a
hot and controversial topic as of this writing. We will take a brief look at the current and
most common methodology of requirements gathering, and then quickly advance to
explore the frontier of Requirements Engineering. An advanced and controversial semi-
formal methods technique from MIT's CSAIL department is reviewed, though such a
method has limited commercial application in the short term. More commercially
palatable methods taking into account socially complex business processes are then
reviewed, including intent specifications, Quality Function Deployment as borrowed
from automotive engineering, and finally, Product Roadmapping.
Why is Requirements Engineering such a hot topic today? Perhaps because
Project Management has been studied intensely for many years in software engineering,
yet still software projects are incredibly problematic:
An astonishing 84 percent of all software projects do not finish on time, on
budget, and with all features installed, according to a survey by the
Standish Group, which studied about 8,000 software projects in the
United States in 1995. Furthermore, more than 30 percent of all projects
were cancelled before completion. The rest ran significantly over
deadline and were 189 percent (on average) over budget. [25]
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Obviously, Project or Development Management techniques alone are either not
working very well or are not the core of the current problem. Traditionally, software
requirements analysis was considered a relatively easy part of the development process.
More recently, it has become increasingly recognized as being the most vital part of the
process; given that the failure to identify requirements properly makes it virtually
impossible for the finished piece of software to meet the needs of the client or to be
finished on time. The term Requirements Engineering emerged in the early 1990's to
stress the importance of treating requirements gathering as an analytical and not just a
managerial process. The topic is gaining momentum and increasing interest in today's
market, with companies becoming more aware of the magnitude of costly ripple effects
from poor Requirements Engineering processes.
Current Requirements Engineering Practice
In most commercial companies, requirements are not so much "engineered" as
gathered and tracked. At the simplest level, requested features must be tracked and
prioritized to help capture requirements in an evolving system. Chapman notes,
One of the chief tasks of a Product Manager is managing what is often
called the wish or "tick" list-that very long list of features and capabilities
requested/conceived of by your developers, customers, user groups,
sales force, the CEO's spouse, etc. [11, p. 571]
Some companies try to over-prioritize bugs and feature requests. Do
organizations really respond to five different levels of bug- and feature request tracking?
Three is sufficient, is likely to cause less confusion and fewer items falling into grey
areas of long term inaction. Chapman suggests the three categories for feature requests
as must haves, should haves, and nice to haves. Given that many feature requests will
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quickly pile up even for a medium-sized product once it hits the market, a company will
need to establish a system of managing feature requests and their state in the development
schedule. Chapman suggests minimum functionality for such a system should include
the following abilities:
* Add feature requests to a central database or list
* Track when a request was made and total up multiple requests
* Map those requests back to a person or group of people
* Categorize feature requests
* Prioritize feature requests
* Keep track of when and whether a feature has been updated
* Tie a feature request to an external document such as a use case [11, p. 573]
Many companies, in the author's experience, maintain feature requests within a
defect database or bug tracking system, with the designation "enhancement" to separate
them out from bug fix requests. In an IT department not releasing software as a product,
sometimes an entire release can be based on prioritized versions of these "enhancement
bugs". It is to be hoped that an actual software product company would use more
sophisticated mechanisms to stay in touch with the market, but this does not always
happen. The author has certainly experienced, in startup companies, features being
implemented on an instant, emergency mode basis because a single customer or the CEO
wants a new feature. This is not universally a bad thing, but such crisis management as a
habit does not make for stable software products providing added market value.
As an example of how rampant poor requirements engineering is in software
companies, the number one answer Product Managers gave in response to complete the
statement, "If I could say one thing to our company president without fear of reprisal, it
would be..." was as follows: "get a long-term strategy that doesn't change with each
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sales contract." [13] The author's experience correlates positively with this survey quote:
the amount of Requirements Engineering executed based on sales contract crisis is
astonishing.
Software Requirements: Never Understood from the Start?
Professor Daniel Jackson, one of the keynote speakers at the 13th International
Conference for Requirements Engineering, interviewed for this thesis. His idea is that
companies simply are not understanding software requirements from the start, and do not
appreciate the technical nature of the problem. The following quotation has company-
specific comments suppressed at his request (the whole interview transcript is in
Appendix C):
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Why think about requirements, because they
change? Right? Now, I don't believe this. And the reason I don't believe
this is the following.. .[although] requirements shifts are a huge source of
complexity in system development, the XP people are working, by and
large, for very conservative companies.... My guess is that the reason the
requirements changed is because they never bothered to really
understand. I'm being very polemical now. But I think what often
happens is, from the software engineer's perspective the requirements
have changed. But the [business layman] on the other side says, "How
did you ever not understand that? What did you think we were doing?"
And they're amazed at the idea. [They're thinking], "We didn't change our
requirements; we always wanted to do it like this." So, there's just a
reluctance to spend time with the customer and truly understand what
their problem is.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, right. And that's definitely part of what I'm
exploring. A typical quote from an average coder I know is, "I've never
met a competent marketing person." It just seems like somewhere the
pipeline of actual requirements to engineers who write code gets broken
85
down, and then the engineers get blamed for everything, or [perhaps I
should say], the programmers get blamed for everything.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Right, exactly. That's exactly what happens.
And one of the reasons is that the initial attempt to characterize the
problem is not sufficiently appreciated as a technical problem. It's
thought to be something that needs less technical expertise. But it needs
more technical expertise. It's the essence of the whole enterprise:
figuring out what you're trying to do. So, that, I think, is a large part of the
problem.
Another part of the problem is, Product Managers and other Marketing personnel
with the business and "people skills" to connect with customers simply do not have the
same level of technical expertise as the average programmer, let alone more expertise
such as a software architect might have. There is an intangible, long, "lossy" pipeline
between what software functionality "the market" actually will pay for and executable
software code. Requirements flow into this pipeline from external sources such as
customers, sales, prospective customers, competitive analysis, industry analysts, and
consultants. Engineering, technical support, partners, and other employees can also serve
as internal sources of requirements. Generally, the pipeline in a full scale company
would be filtered and would flow through Product Managers, to Program Managers, to
Software Architects and Developers. At this last stage, the Developers are, in an ideal
world, presented with the highest priority features with maximum profit generating
potential. They write the code to create these features, and the software sells like
hotcakes to lumberjacks in an Alaska January.
Unfortunately, this pipeline has major flaws. Many of the most profitable
requirements are never pushed into the pipeline as companies do a poor job of listening to
the market. Requirements "leak out" and are lost due to poor communication between
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stages. Requirements become distorted and mistranslated due to miscommunication
between stages, much of this due to the generally increasing level of technical and
decreasing level of business knowledge as the pipeline approaches the coding stage.
Some unprofitable requirements may sneak into the pipeline at the last stage as
Developers sneak pet features in with required features. Another version of this occurs
when Developers expend excessive energy making a feature far more general-purpose
than it needs to be out of the often justified fear that if they do not over-engineer the
feature, Marketing will come back after seeing Feature X working and immediately ask
for Feature X to do X + 1.
The Werewolf Theory of Requirements Engineering
So what do we do about this broken requirements pipeline? Let us look at the
problem philosophically, and at one solution posed at MIT CSAIL, the Computer Science
and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. It is an accepted law of software development
"physics," revealed to the community by Fred Brooks in his famous No Silver Bullet
article, that "there is no single development, in either technology or in management
technique, that by itself promises even one order-of-magnitude improvement in
productivity, in reliability, in simplicity."[26] Requirements engineering is an intractable
problem, a problem impossible to solve at all, let alone at a stroke with one management
technique or well-defined process. Jackson is certainly correct that technical expertise
helps, and perhaps the technical needs of RE are underestimated in today's companies.
What Jackson may underestimate, though, is the sheer humanity and breadth of the
pipeline involved. The MIT community tends to believe in heroic intellectual efforts as
the norm, and the number of stakeholders is limited in a research context, but this is not
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business reality. Numerous stakeholders with radically different self interests all act as
lossy conduits of software requirements between the market and software
implementation. Jackson admits it is difficult to stop and focus on requirements in the
business world:
PROFESSOR JACKSON: "We're going to lose a week's productivity by
drinking coffee and chatting?" You've got to be a gutsy manager to do
that, right? And I can understand that. From a research perspective, we
do that all the time, because we don't have anyone breathing down our
necks. We have much more flexibility in terms of when we deliver value,
and so on.
The Silver Alloy Bullet
Jackson is an advocate of formal methods, and has a fascinating attempt to
advance the science of the Requirements Engineering problem embodied in the invented
language Alloy, product of research funded by the National Science Foundation, and by
the High Dependability Computing Program from NASA Ames Research Center.
Jackson claims Alloy is simpler than a programming language and is an excellent way of
specifying the "schema" of a program.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Alloy, to a novice, might seem complicated,
but semantically it is enormously simpler than any programming
language. I mean, basically, all you've got is sets and relations, that's it.
It's like a database schema but.. .actually; it's basically the same as a
relational database schema.
Alloy was thus evaluated for suitability as a tool for Requirements Engineering by
a technical Product Manager. (Important note: it was the thought of the author-not an
assertion by Jackson-that Alloy might turn out to be a "silver bullet" for Requirements
Engineering.) A seemingly well-written tutorial on Alloy did not quite correspond with
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the functionality actually available on Windows XP. After spending several hours
learning the initial semantics, such as the "3 levels of abstraction to understanding
Alloy"-object oriented, set theoretic, and atomic/relational-the author spent several
more hours attempting to understand and run the examples. The interface seemed
friendly at first, but beyond the most trivial examples there were gross mismatches
between the results pictured in the tutorial and the results shown in the actual program.
After a full working day on the problem, attempting to understand the complex set
theoretic logic and to manipulate the graphical interface of the Alloy simulator to match
the results in the tutorial, a level of frustration was reached as it was impossible to
compare the results graphically. The author was never able to reproduce the graphical
output, shown in Figure 11, for a simple file system. External help would be required,
and the author followed an Alloy home page link to join a Yahoo group on the Alloy
language. In the Yahoo group, the only activity within the past week had been a posting
for a summer internship at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, containing a link leading to a
picture of a rocket scientist. Although hardly a quod erat demonstratum, this line of
inquiry seemed to lend strong credibility to the author's suspicions, formed after many
hours of mind-bending attempts to understand Alloy that formal modeling methods such
as Alloy have not penetrated much below the level of the programmatic equivalent of
rocket science in ease of use and accessibility.
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Figure 11 Graphical output of Alloy Modeling Language (Source:
http://alloy.mit.edu/tutorial3/alloy-tutorial.html)
In fairness to the Alloy developers, they did respond to an email inquiry about the
problems with the tutorial with a correction file for user interface representation. At this
point, however, it had become clear that modeling in Alloy was a highly complex
endeavor. Clearly, the language and methodology is not only far out of reach of the
average Product Manager, but also not likely to be easily grasped by the average software
professional in its present incarnation. Performing Requirements Engineering or system
modeling in Alloy could easily become its own thesis topic, and may be an area for
further work when the interface has been evolved.
Professor Jackson had claimed Alloy was "quite simple" as it was composed only
of "sets and relations", but complexity is like broccoli that must be eaten: one can push it
around on one's plate, but the total mass to be consumed will remain constant. The
simplicity of only two fundamental concepts of "sets and relations" is unfortunately
belied by the mind-bending and myriad ways one must manipulate them using pseudo-
object oriented syntax that may seem simple on the surface, but is extremely difficult to
master. Set theoretic thinking is far different from the object oriented procedural
programming models in the minds of most programmers today.
The comparison to an RDBMS schema breaks down in that an RDBMS schema is
based on tables, easily visualized as rows and columns, enforcing mentally clearer
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limitations on the solution space than a set-theoretic modeling tool that can model any
system. With advancements in ease of use, Alloy may one day prove a useful tool for
technical personnel such as Software Architects, but it is unlikely to develop into
something a Product Manager would use directly.
Bulletproof Social Processes
Formal methods of so-called "program proving" have been around a long time,
but never gained much traction in industry. Alloy is part of the "lightweight formal
methods" movement, but "lightweight" is perhaps a misnomer here. An adult blue whale
on earth is lightweight compared to an ice cream scoop of matter from a black dwarf star.
Analogously, "lightweight" formal methods are only light in comparison to true formal
program verification, accepted by the computing community as virtually impossible for
even modestly sized computer programs. Formal methods were falling out of favor as
early as 1979, when a paper entitled Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and
Programs argued,
Formal verifications of programs, no matter how obtained, will not play the
same key role in the development of computer science and software
engineering as proofs do in mathematics. Furthermore the absence of
continuity, the inevitability of change, and the complexity of specification
of significantly many real programs make the formal verification process
difficult to justify and manage. [27]
Lightweight formal verification advocates believe that programming can be more
like mathematics, and tools like Alloy exist in an attempt to show that, if programs
themselves cannot be proven, at least system specifications can. Perhaps this is so, but
such proofs do not get rid of the social issue:
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We believe that, in the end, it is a social process that determines whether
mathematicians feel confident about a theorem-and we believe that,
because no comparable social process can take place among program
verifiers, program verification is bound to fail. We can't see how it's going
to be able to affect anyone's confidence about programs. [27]
Jackson would surely argue vehemently against this argument applying to
lightweight formal methods the same way it applies to formal verification and his
research seeks to prove the contrary. It seems there is still a long way to go in making
lightweight formal methods straightforward to use, and the fact is that industry has thus
far largely eschewed lightweight formal methods as intractable. Jackson discussed the
difficulties of getting industry to buy into formal methods in his interview:
JOHN HEMPE: I think part of it is getting something well known and
[professionally] leverageable enough.... It's a matter of showing the
power, and showing that an average professional can think on that level.
And I sometimes wonder if we sometimes just run into cognitive limits
where it's really hard to think in these advanced ways.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: But it's just abstraction, right?
JOHN HEMPE: Absolutely. Abstraction is the most noble, but also the
most difficult form of thinking.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I agree, I think you're right, but why should
you think the average professional would need to do that? Why isn't it
just like the schema designer?
JOHN HEMPE: The Architect.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Yes, the architect. It's going to be a smaller
group of people who do that kind of work.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, right.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: And the rest of the people will do much more
concrete work, dealing with the details of the code.
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JOHN HEMPE: So the important thing is to have a few key experts who
are able to specify the system in this formal language.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I think that is essential.
JOHN HEMPE: I agree, in principle.
In practice, however, each and every programmer at most software companies
acts as a mini-architect when coding individual features. This is certainly true at
Microsoft. They might stay within generally framed architectural boundaries, but
certainly not within anything as specific as a program schema like Alloy or any other
lightweight formal method tool would produce.
A small group of architects can specify a skyscraper or a bridge and then farm out
the work to construction crews and engineers, but software development is quirky, more
creative and artistic than a "mere matter of engineering" in most cases. The side effect is
that software development simply does not have such clean division of labor between
architects and engineers. Perhaps the division of labor problem, the difficulty in having a
bright, clear line between the few architects and the many engineers, partially explains
industry resistance to the kind of hierarchical engineering organization lightweight formal
methods imply.
Capturing Requirements with Social Process Methods
Formal and semi-formal methods do not seem to solve the software requirements
pipeline problem, at least for average commercial projects. Sheer complexity and a lack
of advanced tools make them inaccessible to average professionals. They do not take
into account the "dirty" problem of social and business complexity, although advocates
might argue this is not their job. Regardless, methods are needed that do help with the
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social process, rather than focusing completely on verification and modeling. We will
look at three such advance methods, roughly in order of increasing practicality and
current usage. The methods are Intent Specifications, Quality Function Deployment, and
Roadmapping. The first method is currently in use mostly in the military/aerospace
industry; the second is in limited use in the software industry, although several automated
software packages have been written to facilitate its use for the purpose; and the third is
in fairly widespread use by software companies both as a Requirements Engineering tool
and as a preemptive marketing tool.
Intent Specifications
Intent Specifications is a method proposed by MIT Professor Nancy Leveson to
facilitate "grounding specification design on psychological principles of how humans use
specifications to solve problems as well as on basic system engineering principles."[28]
Taking a cognitive psychological approach, she notes that interface design must address
the aspects of content, structure, andform to serve as an effective medium. A Product
Manager would not necessarily be involved in all levels of creating this kind of
specification, but the interesting thing about the method is that it is "rooted in
abstractions based on intent." Intent abstraction is shown on the vertical axis in Figure
12.
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Figure 12 Intent specification structure for software systems [28]
A detailed study of the method is beyond our scope, but the advantages of
capturing and systemizing intent rather than onlyfunctionality should be clear to the
Product Manager. Ideally, the PM discovers and specifies the market's intent, or goals,
for a system (or an upgrade) it will purchase, while it is in the realm of engineering how
the system realizes the goals with specific functionality. Leveson's driving example is
TCAS II, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System for aircraft. As an example of top level
system intent, the System Purpose (goal), with GI being the high level goal and RI as a
refined subgoal, would appear as follows:
Gi: Provide affordable and compatible collision avoidance system
options for a broad spectrum of National Airspace System users.
RI: Provide collision avoidance protection for any two aircraft closing
horizontally at any rate up to 1200 knots and vertically up to 10,000 feet
per minute. [28, p. 10]
The PM would be primarily responsible for the first two levels including the
System Design Principles. At this level, engineering consultations begin as this level
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specifies the principles needed to realize the top level purpose behavior. In the TCAS II
example, one example of a principle is this:
PRI: Each TCAS-equipped aircraft is surrounded by a protected volume
of airspace. The boundaries of this volume are shaped by the tau and
DMOD criteria. [28, p. 14]
The method of Intent specifications works by deriving the system through
successive layers of human intent-based abstraction, thus simplifying requirements from
the often huge laundry list of functional specifics. Noted computer scientist and software
reliability specialist Martyn Thomas, founder of Praxis software (and a believer in
lightweight formal methods) recently wrote,
Requirements are often complex because they contain unnecessary
implementation detail, or elaboration of many special cases that could be
better expressed as a general principle. [29]
Simplification of requirements expression is thus one major advantage of Intent
Specifications. Another advantage is that system intent is often lost in large laundry lists
of desired functionality; this method makes intent explicit by centering the specification
process on the cognitive psychology of human intent. This seems like a good idea, given
that people, not functionality list processing machines, will write and use the resultant
software.
QFD: Quality Function Deployment
The QFD design tool originally had nothing to do with software. According to
Hauser and Clausing in their much-cited Harvard Business Review article, The House of
Quality, QFD "originated in 1972 at Mitsubishi's Kobe shipyard site. Toyota and its
suppliers (such as Bridgestone Tire) then developed it in numerous ways." [30]
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Eventually, American auto manufacturers and other manufacturing companies began
adopting the methodology, which Hauser and Clausing call "a kind of conceptual map
that provides the means for interfunctional planning and communications."
With roots deeply in manufacturing, the House of Quality was first academically
applied to software applications in a 1990 MIT thesis by Laura Donohue entitled
Software Product Development: An Application of the Integration of R&D and
Marketing via Quality Function Deployment, exploring "the integration of corporate
functions to provide the cross-fertilization of functional technologies and ideas, as well as
the communication of independent functional needs during the process of product
delivery."[31] Today, while QFD hardly dominates the software world, it has become an
important part of the "Six Sigma for Software" movement. Several QFD / House of
Quality software products intended for software design exist on the market today, and an
extensive Web community exists in support of the topic, including such sites as the
following: http://software.isixsigna.com/, a site supporting QFD and other Six Sigma
techniques adapted for software.
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The positive side of the QFD technique for software is the integration of
marketing (customer) and R&D perspectives. A schematic version of the House of
Quality is shown in Figure 13. Customer needs are listed along the vertical axis (rows)
Customer Requirements, and software features are listed along the horizontal axis
(columns), labeled Supplier Measurable Responses.
Figure 13 Basic QFD House of Quality (Source: http://software.isixsigma.com)
Although a useful tool, the QFD technique has some weaknesses when applied to
software. An article on the Six Sigma for Software Web site notes the translation issues
in applying a manufacturing model to software:
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Software design presents interesting challenges for several reasons.
Software is an intangible product that is not always conducive to explicit
acceptance measures. Design elements are coupled and interdependent,
which is different from physical designs that can be deconstructed into
independent but functional sub-assemblies, parts, and components.
Software is not so easily divisible, creating additional design challenges.
[32]
The article goes on to suggest methods of modifying QFD for software, beginning
with a definition of "relevant and tangible customer needs." The article references the
ISO 9126 standard, structuring customer needs into six product characteristics:
Functionality, Reliability, Usability, Efficiency, Maintainability, and Portability. A long
matrix attempting to build a taxonomy of customer needs based on these six attributes is
given.
Software, being design embodied, tends to resist such general purpose
taxonomies. QFD will not provide us with an easy, cookie-cutter approach to solve the
Requirements Engineering problem, with or without laborious taxonomies and other
attempts at adaptation from the manufacturing sector. It does, however, provide a good
starting point for organizing and visualizing the interrelationships between perceived
needs of customers and marketers versus developed and developing software features.
Roadmapping
Roadmapping is a forward-looking Requirements Engineering process. Whereas
the other methods discussed involve capturing needs mostly for the version of a product
immediately in the development pipeline, roadmapping often involves projections up to
several versions or even years into the future. Richard Albright of the Product
Development and Management Association defines roadmapping as follows: "Product-
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Technology Roadmaps link market and competitive strategy to product plans to
technology strategy - with quantitative targets and plans for achieving objectives."[33]
Visual Example of a Roadmap
Element types within a roadmap are usually Anything within a business can be uisually represented
grouped with common elements using categories on a roadmap using a variety of shapes, colors and images
Figure 14 Visual Roadmap Example 1341
Although many consulting firms and software packages exist to support
roadmapping, the process is neither standardized, nor has it been reduced to "mere
engineering." Some companies use roadmapping for internal planning, while others use
it more as a marketing tool. Alcatel performed a detailed study covering 246 projects on
Requirements Engineering focused on reducing downstream requirements changes,
noting, "A common denominator of requirements changes is that they practically always
correlate with project delays." Changes occur for several reasons, the most important
among them being, "stakeholders often do not agree on content and later demand
changes," and also, "requirements are not uniformly visible and thus not agreed by
different teams." Alcatel claims they were able to reduce delays over 20% per year using
a variety of techniques, primarily by an increased "integration of upstream processes with
the product life-cycle related RE processes," a form of technology roadmapping. Non-
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roadmapping techniques were also used, such as, "install an effective core team for each
product release," so the benefits cannot be conclusively or entirely attributed to
roadmapping. [3]
Roadmapping as a Marketing Tool
Some professionals are more skeptical about roadmapping as a purely technical
exercise. Chapman claims that product roadmaps are more marketing instruments than
pure technical planning tools. He introduces roadmapping as follows:
First developed in the 60s and 70s primarily as weapons in technology
companies' FUD [Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt] arsenals, product
roadmaps are ostensibly sneak peeks into the future that also function as
obstacles to competition. [11]
Microsoft, for instance, always seems to have a roadmapped solution to any
software problem if they are not selling something in the space presently. Some of the
few books on Software Product Management do not mention roadmapping at all, but
books and Internet sources that do mention it place it in the realm of the Product Manager
to create and maintain as a tool for coordinating stakeholders as well as for visualizing
future strategy. Chapman gives a brief three-element list of the product roadmap
components:
" Projected release dates for future versions of a product or product line
" A very high-level overview of new functionality
" A discussion of what new hardware and software platforms your software will
be running on
He cautions, however, about revealing competitive information in a product
roadmap, as roadmaps given to customers, or certainly to the press, will invariably fall
into the hands of the competition. "If a roadmap is too feature-specific," he notes,
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"you've just given your competition valuable information about future versions of your
product well in advance of your product's release." On the plus side, roadmaps can be
powerful instruments for maintaining current customers:
One advantage of showing your customer a broad roadmap is that it can
increase their confidence that the product they purchase will be supported
and available in the future. In addition, showing customers a carefully
crafted roadmap can support your sales of maintenance and service
agreements. [11]
Benefits and Challenges of Roadmapping as an Evolving Method
Back on the technical side, one paper from the 13th International Conference on
Requirements Engineering (2005) describes a University of Helsinki study of
roadmapping as a way to "link the business view to requirements engineering." We will
conclude our discussion of roadmapping with a list summarizing some of their most
important findings:
" Roadmapping strengthened the link between business decisions and
Requirements Engineering
" Product Managers saw roadmaps as tools for communicating their ideas to
other stakeholders
* Developer viewpoint was less emphasized compared to that of other
stakeholders (management, sales, channel partners, and customers)
" Practitioners complained roadmaps got immediately out-of-date
" Practitioners were missing ways to tie product development resources to
roadmaps [35]
Engineering Software Requirements in the Future
All parts of software creation are rife with difficulty, as we are reminded by
Brooks. Writing correct code is still more art than science and maintaining code is
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extremely costly. Yet executing a process of Requirements Engineering to meet market
needs-addressing individual customer needs as well as collective market needs without
evolving a software system into a brittle and unprofitable corner-may be the most
challenging problem in software product creation. Certainly, it is the most expensive
problem if done poorly, as all phases of the product life cycle are affected by mistakes,
omissions, and unnecessary additions at this early but critical phase. Semi-formal
methods may not be the Requirements Engineering solution for commercial software, but
Jackson was correct in saying, "It's the essence of the whole enterprise: figuring out
what you're trying to do."
We have seen that today, many companies still succumb to a crisis-management
approach to Requirements Engineering, or at best, keep a fairly informal prioritized list.
With excellent Product and Program Managers, the prioritized list or database approach
can and does work for companies. Methods do exist, however, to help managers and
businesses to engineer their requirements rather than only to gather and best-guess
prioritize them. At the very least, methods such as the matrix-based Quality Function
Deployment may help managers to organize their thoughts and avoid blind spots in
connecting product and technology requirements to profit generating market needs.
Injecting a crisis-motivated feature now and then will not necessarily kill a product line,
but is a bad habit into which companies can, and do, easily fall. A disciplined
Requirements Engineering process can help a company avoid this habit by forcing a
coherent vision for its product lines and their evolving feature sets.
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VII. Conclusion
Product Managers face a challenging world in which emergent technologies and
economics change perhaps faster than in any other product market in history. The
original premise of the author going into this thesis considered Product Management to
be primarily an engineering function. Research showed, however, that the function
emerged from Proctor & Gamble's marketing role and bridges across to development
from marketing rather than the other way around. The truly successful PM bridges the
gaps in the corporation, connecting the points of Ebert's "Bermuda Triangle" between
marketing, strategy, and engineering to prevent product value in the marketplace from
mysteriously vanishing.
We have seen that Microsoft worked to bridge the marketing / engineering gap
from both ends, hoping to meet in the middle, by creating an engineering-oriented
version of the Product Manager in the form of the Program Manager. Microsoft's market
success is undisputed, and this structure has been imitated by many successful software
companies, but not all. Google, for instance, does not use the Program management role
and instead splits the PM role into Business and Technical versions of the job. Half of all
PMs are now involved in the writing of detailed specifications, and the technical demands
of the job have recently been trending upwards.
On that front, the emerging field of Requirements Engineering was explored, but
obvious, simple, or one-size-fits-all technical or managerial solutions to the problem
prove elusive. As with many aspects of software product creation, the "ancient" wisdom
of Fred Brooks' No Silver Bullet applies in this area. RE fails to yield to any single
technical solution. Semi-formal models were explored, most notably the set theoretic
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modeling language Alloy, but this method quickly proved worthy of a Computer Science
thesis in and of itself. Further work in this area may involve exploration of ways to make
Alloy usable for technical PMs. Also, domain-specific Alloy with pre-designed patterns
for certain domains might make it more practically useful. The success of analogous
specification languages such as SQL for RDBMS schema creation may be partially
attributed to domain specificity.
Regardless of advances in Alloy or similar approaches, RE will prove intractable
to solution by any "killer application" or tool. Enterprise software provides a perfect
illustration as to why this is the case: such software models how people and
organizations do business with each other. In such systems, all the intractable
complexities of personal and organizational interaction are innately embedded. Problems
arise from straightforward communication difficulties and issues such as the tribal nature
of human beings. Chapman notes there is a "natural tension that exists between
functional groups. Each group has its own perception of the value it brings to the group
and stereotypical perceptions about the other groups... .These tensions and issues are
natural and cannot be reversed." [11, p. 567]
The PM's job will thus never be radically simplified by automated requirements
capture tools. Inter-group tensions will always have to be managed, and as interviewee
Philip DesAutels noted, alignment of stakeholders is a core competency of the successful
PM. Marketers want to create collateral and buzz, salesmen want to sell, developers want
to code, but it is up to the PM to hold up a hand and ensure that what Professor Jackson
recommends takes place: "At the beginning, you should figure out what problem you're
trying to solve, and you should have some fairly precise characterization of that
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problem." Whether this is performed using semi-formal models for a high availability or
high security product, or QFD, or simply keeping a well managed database of features, is
beside the point. The PM and the systems architects must synthesize the vision for and
maintain the conceptual integrity of the product.
Leadership, an easy word to use but a difficult one to define precisely, is
ultimately the critical skill of the PM. Advancements in project management methods
and Requirements Engineering tools may make the job incrementally more tractable, but
no technical solution will obviate the need for PMs to be business leaders of cross
functional teams. No single piece of advice can make a great leader. Interviewee
Shuman Ghosemajumder, a top PM practitioner at industry leader Google, made this
unintentionally sage comment about leadership:
One thing I heard about Product Management is to remember as a
Product Manager that you are the one person on the team that is
completely disposable. If you always remember that, keep your eye on
the ball of adding value to the team, then you will be successful.
Of course, the apparent paradox is that only through such humility does one have
a chance to emerge as the successful CEO of the product, the "completely critical" person
on the team. Ghosemajumder's comment dovetails nicely with Professor Giovanni
Gavetti's closing comments on leadership in Harvard Business School's Strategic
Reasoning Laboratory course: "The right combination of humility and thinking big is, I
think, the key to being a great leader."
Excellent PMs are extremely valuable in the marketplace, because the ideal PM
has a rare combination of people and technical skills. Good PMs are competent systems
architects, but the process of gaining these skills is solitary and often limits the architect's
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finesse with people. Those from a pure marketing background may have the finesse with
people but lack systems architecture skills, damaging the conceptual integrity of the
product vision. The best PMs have both of these opposing skills and are rare. As
software product systems continue to increase in functionality and complexity, the value
of this rare skill set will continue to increase, as will the need for better education in cross
functional skill sets such as MIT's System Design and Management program is designed
to provide.
Ultimately, it is impossible to create an instruction manual or otherwise easily
capture all the elements of successful Product Management, just as there has never been a
successful manual on how to be the CEO of a corporation. At the same time, no amount
of process management can circumvent the need for the Product Manager. Philip
DesAutels of Microsoft said in his interview,
No matter what the process is, there's a little box where it says, "a bit of
magic happens here." At the end of a car assembly line, there's a group
of people called the "fixers" who do a lot of ad hock fixes. They might
have hammers, two by fours, even strange things like pillows. A big part
of Product Management is the "fixer" job, where the magic happens.
Attempting to subdivide the job further to avoid the need for interdisciplinary
skills simply does not work, as this complex confluence of skills is precisely what is
needed to perform the magic in that little box at the nexus between marketing,
engineering, and strategic management.
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Appendix A: The Great Windows / UNIX Platform
Battle and Software Commoditization
Parallel Timelines in Hardware and Software
Everyone knows that Microsoft is ascendant in the world of prepackaged software
products, and the Windows operating system dominant on Intel-based PCs. Most people
know at least of the existence of UNIX, which seemed to be losing relevance for awhile
until the advent of Linux and the new vitality of Open Source. Not everyone, especially
younger IT professionals, understands how this came to be. The fact that there are
specific parallel timelines in the development of the software product market may not be
so obvious.
Why is this relevant to software Product Management? Both the markets for
software products, and the stage of the competitive landscape, have been set by these
powerful, parallel trends in software & hardware history. The future stage and market,
furthermore, will be to some degree determined by the trajectory of these continuing
timelines. The timelines we consider begin at the end of the Punch Card era and the
beginning of the timeshared "green screen" terminal era.
The Mainframe to UNIX to Open Source Timeline
A picture is worth a thousand words, so we will begin the discussion with a graphical
timeline covering the Mainframe hardware and Unix OS path. Of course, many, many
things happened in computing during this period, only a few highlights are given for the
purposes of illuminating this discussion.
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Figure 15 Timeline I: The Mainframe / UNIX Path
Early in "post-Punch Card" software history, mainframes (mostly IBM but also
others, such as Burroughs, Sperry-Univac, and NCR) dominated business use. As 1970
approached, minicomputers arose, famously the PDP-11. The PDP-11 and VAX-li
machines, the latter being more business-oriented, became the reference systems for a
new operating system called UNIX, which came out of AT&T Bell Labs. UNIX was not
very important until the mid-1970's, when UC Berkeley's Computer Systems Research
Group got ahold of it, the project being underwritten by the Defense Advanced Projects
Agency (DARPA).
This project caused some landmark additions to UNIX and made it truly an
industrial strength operating system: these additions included virtual memory, a robust
and faster file system, and the vital TCP/IP network protocol in 1973-74. With the help
of continued DARPA support, Berkeley continued to work on UNIX into the late 1970's,
releasing the landmark 3BSD (Berkeley Source Distribution) in 1979. A lot of
proprietary work was going on as well-this is nowhere near a full recounting of the
history of Unix, as we are interested in the trend leading to open source-but the BSDs
were instrumental in getting an entire culture of computer programmers used to the idea
of sharing source code, mostly through creating and releasing utilities for the operating
system along with source code.
Unix, especially the BSDs, along with the advent of fast CPU's, specifically the
Motorola 68000 series during the mid-1970's to early 1980's, ushered in an era of
ubiquitous and collaborative computing. Email and USENET groups (this was before
they became drowned with Spam) helped advance this trend. The hardware was a
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necessary backdrop, but it was UNIX that created a common, standard platform to allow
the code sharing trend to achieve a critical mass. [12]
One early culmination of this trend toward ubiquitous and collaborative
computing was the GNU project, started in 1984 by a group centered on Richard
Stallman, who quit his job at MIT and created the immensely popular EMACS editor,
further fomenting the subculture of shared code and eventually drafting the GNU General
Public License or "copyleft". This constituted the first legally binding construct
supporting the open computing philosophy. At this point, the foundations for open
source had been laid. The term "open source" did not exist yet and would not be coined
until about in 1998, but let us jump the track here in about 1984-85 and ride the parallel
track of highly proprietary computing.
The Intel to IBM / Microsoft to Wintel Timeline
Many works exist to describe this parallel timeline, which created a business
monster of proprietary computing, the richest man in the world, and such a powerful
hardware/software duopoly as to incite numerous antitrust actions by the Department of
Justice. Microsoft Secrets by Cusumano and Selby gives a detailed account of the
Microsoft side and Inside Intel: Andrew Grove and the Rise of the World's Most
Powerful Chip Company by Jackson covers the other. The reader is most likely familiar
with this famous business story, so a sparse timeline and recounting should suffice.
1982
1978 Intel 80286/ IBM PC 1994 2000
1968 1975 Intel 8086 1981 1990 Windows NT 3.5 Intel Pentium 4: Cheap
Intel Founded Microsoft Founded MS DOS Windows 3.0 PC Servers Have Arrived
1968 2000
Altair 8800 first personal CPU w/Intel 8080 Win95 (Internet enabled)
1976 Intel Inside: "WinTel" PCs Ascendant 1995
1991
Figure 16 Timeline II: The Wintel / Proprietary Computing Timeline
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This timeline starts about three years later than the previous one, in 1968 with the
founding of Intel, and is essentially "asleep" until 1975-76, when Microsoft was founded
and the Altair 8800 personal computer was released. Bill Gates, acting as an early "anti-
Stallman", takes a passionately proprietary view of his programming work. The
timelines nearly converged early on as Microsoft licensed UNIX and began working on
XENIX, a PC version. However, this effort was eclipsed by the release of what became
the prodigiously popular MS-DOS (Microsoft Disk Operating System) for IBM in 1981.
Microsoft retained ownership of virtually all rights to the software, and in 1982, the ball
was rolling with IBM PCs (or simply PCs) rolling out with the new Intel 80286
microprocessor running MS-DOS.
For our purposes, we can skip ahead to 1990 when the "Wintel" (Windows
operating system running on Intel-based IBM clones) architecture computer truly began
with Microsoft's release of Windows 3.0. Intel launched the historically successful
branding maneuver represented by the "Intel Inside" marketing campaign in 1991.
Embarrassing bugs and instability were largely corrected by the Windows 3.1 upgrade in
1992, and from that point on the Wintel architecture dominated the personal computer
world, marginalizing all other players, most notably Apple computer.
Microsoft was fantastically successful on this timeline and became, perhaps, the
most profitable business in history because they had the best of all possible worlds: they
benefited from, on the one hand, an open hardware platform which created great
economies of scale and choice in hardware. With a binary-compatible architecture and
standardized hardware platform, thanks to reference designs created by the tight
Intel/Microsoft relationship, the two achieved their own version of ubiquitous computing.
Although Intel profited greatly, Microsoft was the truly historical winner because, as
hardware became commoditized, they kept a fiercely proprietary hold on the software:
the Windows operating system. This monopolistic stranglehold on the operating system
acted as a gateway to allow them to become easily the number one seller of applications,
most notably the set which became the Microsoft Office suite. The company was, is, and
for the near future will remain the number one success story in Software Product
Management, marketing, and sales.
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Some attribute this to Bill Gates' brilliance and vision, others to his avarice and a
lucky spot in hardware / software history. Perhaps, to some degree, both are true.
Regardless, the Wintel architecture was ascendant by the mid-1990's, and slowly moved
up-market as hardware advanced and the Windows NT operating system came into play.
As 2000 approached, Intel Pentium processors arrived on the scene, cranking up toward
the Pentium IV and encroaching upon the performance capabilities of industrial strength
UNIX servers. At the same time, an ex-Digital Equipment engineer named Dave Cutler
created an industrial strength version of the Windows operating system, the
aforementioned Windows NT, with a Unix-like kernel.
The Non-Euclidean Software Market: Do Parallel Lines Ever
Meet?
The parallel timelines were beginning to converge as the millennium approached,
or perhaps "collide" would be a more appropriate term. The up-market migration of PCs
with better operating systems and faster hardware began to threaten the idea of the
"industrial strength" workstation and server, since PCs equipped with Windows NT 3.5
began to be good enough to act as servers.
We left the Mainframe - UNIX timeline in 1984-85. Another trend crossing over
to threaten the workstation and server market on that timeline was the creation of Linux
by a Finnish university student, Linus Torvalds. The most important thing Linux
provided was the ability to run UNIX on the increasingly powerful Intel-architecture PCs.
This further threatened the dominance of old school "industrial strength" workstations
and servers such as those provided by Sun Microsystems. The UNIX world is thus being
badly threatened by the PC world's economies of scale. Our timeline ends in 2000, but
as of this writing in 2006, Sun Microsystems has never recovered at least in terms of
stock price, and some believe they are languishing as a marginalized player due largely to
the ascendance of Linux and server-powerful PCs.
So far, the threats discussed are all against the Mainframe / UNIX / high end
server and workstation market, but the collision goes both ways. Intel architecture
computers running Linux are notably not running Microsoft Windows. The Wintel
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architecture started ubiquitous computing, but it was the UNIX line and TCP/IP that
spawned ubiquitous networked computing, and Wintel was late to that game.
Ubiquitous Networked Computing
TCP/IP came from the UNIX timeline in 1973, but a disruptive event warping
both timelines and certainly a major force setting them on a collision course was the
advent of the World Wide Web, which became a major force in 1993 with the release of
the NCSA Mosaic Web browser. The World Wide Web and associated browsers
undoubtedly brought the Internet to the masses and made networked computing truly
ubiquitous.
With PCs encroaching on the server market, Sun Microsystems made its great
play, a play that was wildly successful as a technology, but not as great a play in terms of
business. The play was centered on the Java programming language. Java began as an
effort to create a hardware platform for interactive television, with Thompson-Sun and
BroadVision (an effort with which the author was involved) but the trend toward
interactive TV turned out to be a false trend as far as the mid-1990's were concerned.
What Sun Microsystems did do was some amazing jujitsu with Java: they flipped
it from an interactive TV idea to a proposed foundation for a platform designed to
counter the Wintel world. Java was essentially given away which helped its deep
adoption in industry, with Sun emulating to some degree the Berkeley Software
Distribution philosophy of the early UNIX days. Java was originally targeted toward
interactive applications and Web browsers, with a "write once, run everywhere" motto.
However, it ended up becoming most important for back end server systems and a top
server technology through its J2EE platform.
Unintended Consequences and Open Source
Java and its evolution into J2EE created a standardized network computing
platform which, at first, made enterprise software companies a lot of money. However,
the Open Source community, whose philosophy was set in the UNIX timeline at the
origin of GNU and its General Public License, was able to embrace this free and open
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platform. The culture set up by GNU migrated into the Java world, and a new threat-at
least from a business standpoint-emerged: the commoditization of enterprise software
and software utilities. JBoss, a free J2EE server implementation, began encroaching on
IBM's profitable Websphere and BEA System's profitable WebLogic.
Sun Microsystems wanted to defend against Wintel; it certainly did not intend to
set off a wave of commoditization. However, this is exactly what happened: they
essentially subsidized the open source community by giving away their software
technology. One could argue that they made a grievous mistake of the kind Bill Gates
would never make: treating the software as "free" to sell a hardware platform instead of
the other way around. Of course, what brilliant strategy it would have taken to get Java
adopted as a more proprietary platform is difficult to say, especially in a market where
Wintel was already ascendant.
Timeline Collision and Fallout
Moore's Law, that transistor density will double essentially every 24 months,
guaranteed that the cost of computing hardware platforms would decrease drastically.
What no one predicted is that the software has also dropped shockingly in value, both in
terms of operating system (Linux is free) and newly commoditized enterprise software.
The central element of the collision: Java and the UNIX / Open Source world inspired
the inexpensive software, but the software runs on inexpensive PCs.
Meanwhile, the hardware was created by the Wintel architecture, but the
ascension of Linux may encroach on Microsoft Windows' dominance of that software.
Because of the aggressive Open Source community, able to use Linux and the open
networked computing platform of Java/J2EE, development tools and platforms are
becoming free or very inexpensive. Once-profitable middleware, including application
servers and Web servers, is losing its value as Open Source projects offer fairly robust
and free alternative versions.
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The Resultant Software Product Black Hole: Commoditization
Unfortunately, in the short term at least, the collision of the two timelines has
created what is hard not to see as an "everybody loses" scenario-at least, everyone with
a profit motive loses. Cheap or free platforms, cheap or free software tools, and even
cheap or free enterprise software creates a drastic downward pressure on the price of
what were once highly profitable software product segments.
It can be aggravating for a business person to see: Why are all these people
giving away their labor? Why are they ruining the profit motive, do they not have to feed
their families, do they not want to save for their future, buy a better car? Yet this is the
reality and a difficult one for software product managers to deal with.
The truth is that some Open Source advocates truly are odd ducks with ascetic
tendencies, such as Richard Stallman, of whom MIT Professor Michael Cusumano once
said, "was content to live in essentially a closet." A more general truth is that the
economic value of these software product profit-destroyers' efforts does not simply
vanish, but is converted into reputation, community esteem, and eventually back into
dollars as many of the elite developers accept high paying contracts and corporate jobs
with companies smart enough to appropriate their talent. Profits in an open source world
revolve more around network effects of massive and free distribution, followed by the
selling of supporting services and perhaps proprietary "add-on" software.
A much deeper examination of the effects of Open Source on the software market,
considered a source of new service opportunities by some and catastrophic for the
software market by others, is a worthy topic but beyond the scope of this work.
Understanding the key fact that Open Source is here to stay, and puts downward pressure
on especially enterprise software prices, are the key concepts for the Product Manager to
understand and accept. Industry titan IBM, powerful bellwether for the direction of the
market due to sheer size if nothing else, has embraced Open Source and the viability of
the Linux movement.
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Appendix B: Industry Practitioner Interviews
Scott Case, Atlas Solutions
DATE: 02/03/2006
SUBJECT: Scott Case, Product Manager
COMPANY: Atlas Solutions, a subsidiary of the aQuantive Group
* How do you describe the role of Product manager in your present position?
Chameleon Technologies - wireless, Seattle "Product Marketing Strategy" Jeff-
6 months, been working as a generalist on competitive positioning, market analysis, not
product specific.
I own what happens to software in one of our four major product areas. It's called
the Atlas Media Console. This is a tool that allows traffickers and planners at advertising
agencies to set up, deliver, and track performance of online advertising. "Adjacent
space" WebTrends, more of a reporting / analysis tool-how do they navigate the site.
"Uneasy neighbors." Potentially complementary players.
Atlas is the technology provider, behind the media console, Atlas has 6 data
centers around the world that do the image store / ad delivery. Does data processing to
prepare results for campaign. They pay for ad serving on a volume basis.
The Product manager decides what features to add to the product. He or she will
work with one or two Program managers to prioritize the features, and will write a
Business Requirements Document to give an idea what should generally be in the release.
The Program managers work with developers and Project managers to kick back schedule
estimates. As needed, of course, there is a feedback loop to clarify and change course
during a project.
o How does the actual position differ from your imagined perceptions before you
started?
More or less what he expected. Bit more on the business development. Here are
customer needs, and I see that development can do maybe 10 of 300 desired features. I
go out and meet with the top 25 clients; I have met with 15-20 of the top 25 clients,
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phone calls with others. So direct discussion. Feedback from a high level to a low level.
Account Directors are responsible for managing the strategic relationship with large
clients. Atlas has 2 specific documents, 1 is a strategic development priorities document.
10 large projects on that list. 9 - 12 months per project. "If we do them [set of
interrelated, strong features as opposed to fragmentary, incremental improvements] we
can come out with a big press release." Second document with a bunch of feature
enhancement level requests, 1 - 30 day mini-projects usually single developer. Plan to
the 1st list, such as redesign work flow. Smaller list, does the large project require feature
enhancements on the smaller list? Hard to productize / advertise small "feature creep"
enhancements. Completing a coherent set of feature upgrades composes a major project
that can be advertised.
* Do you think PM is really one role or multiple roles which have not been
thoroughly differentiated in the software industry?
Position not cohesive. Wear many hats. Once you've proved you can handle the basis,
and then you can do lots of things. BASICS: Translate customer needs, 300 to 10, which
ones to do and why? Pick next ones, detailed business requirements. Work with
Program M's to drill down to the details. Then work with the outbound marketers, how
to price, market and sells.
When told about one MSFT PM's definition of the role (Bill Shelton): Scott feels that
each PM at Microsoft has a subset of activities, the title is just broad there. You're very
focused at MSFT, with one small sliver of the world. MSFT is transitioning to more of
the traditional corporate PM versus software product management. Virtually
monopolistic control enables them to "slow the clock speed" [of the market].
* How do you think PM in software differs from PM in traditional companies, for
example, product management of Gillette Foamy or Crest Toothpaste?
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No experience with non-software project management. "Clock speed is faster", industry
moves very quickly. "Web Side Story" acquired Visual Sciences, changed the road map
for what's going on in the industry. Google is a huge competitor, started giving away a
site analytics tool called Urchin. Productizing a feature set so that you can market
changes as an actual coherent product upgrade is another challenge. In software, cannot
be a perfectionist with incredibly tight 3 month project cycles. Product management is
"inbound" whereas Product Marketing is "outbound". Product Marketing manager or
Marketing Communications - outbound.
* What do you think is the most important PM challenge in the particular case of
software products?
People want 300 features and you can only do 10. There are difficult tradeoffs in
implementing new features. "Who are you going to piss off who are you going to
serve?" Tradeoffs involve "keeping the lights on" versus innovation. We serve 110,000
ads per second. 6 billion ads a day. SLA (software license agreement) says you must
respond within 2 milliseconds. 99.9999% uptime. Never goes down. Must dedicate
enough resources to keep the lights on 24 x 7. Some of the innovations they do alter the
way the infrastructure does what it is doing. So new features have a deeply cascading
effect into the system which is tricky considering you have to keep the thing up 24x7.
Finishing up a project next months which had 5 separate development teams, some front-
end, some more focused on database engineering, some focused on impact to ad-serving
infrastructure, some focus on post-service data processing procedures. Last focused on
changes to reporting tools. All 1 project. Roll out one data center at a time. Try not to
impact the ad serving. Development leads use SCRUM methodology, and work together.
SCRUM meetings are internal, but then lnce a day 15 minute meeting of leads. Most of
the 5 teams are in Seattle. Bullpen area in XP pairs. There is 1 outsourced development
team in India, but the software modules must be very well defined. Shipping software
CD's. But the outsourcing hasn't worked out well. We seem to have difficulties making
outsourcing work. It is very hard to carve off modular tasks.
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* Do you feel Atlas is a software product company? Or is it a hybrid of products &
services? If so, what percentage do you feel is products and what percent are
services?
Atlas is probably an even hybrid play. A ton of client services / trafficking work. 50 / 50
is Atlas Solution. A client must buy a big service component when they buy product. In
the U.K. it's probably 60 / 40 services / software. Within aQuantive, it's probably 80 /
20. Drive Performance Media's case, sell online advertising space. AvenueA does the
whole ad agency thing. "Drive PM" is an ad network.
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Philip DesAutels, Microsoft
DATE: 04/28/2006
SUBJECT: Philip DesAutels, Academic Liaison
Formerly Product Manager, Web Services
COMPANY: Microsoft
* How do you describe the role of Product manager in your present position?
Former position: Web Services, a product that shipped internally. Managed a
series of technologies, making sure they were in sync with industry and customer's
demands. Made sure the developers were developing what the customers were asking
for. Web Services was an interoperability platform. Really a very technical marketing
role.
* How did you interact with the developers? Program managers?
There is one General manager & several Program managers. There's a ship date,
more-or-less set in stone. Series of multiple product life cycles. I was driving "indigo", a
code word for Web Services technologies, standards called WS-*. Post-SOAP
technologies, involving authentication, workflow, and security. Bill Shelton's is a superb
definition of Product management. Depending on the product, might be talking to the
press. I was talking to the press and being quoted in 6-7 articles a week.
A reporter talks to PR firm, PR firm sends them to Product manager, the PM
brings in a developer. Set up a set of messages you want to go out. Work with developer
to make sure they're shooting for the image you want to go out. For instance, Web
Services are an interoperability play. As a role it's a very hard role. Real developers
tend to write you off as irrelevant if you're a pure Marketing / Finance person. Having
some empathy, understanding, and credentials in software is helpful.
Once you have credibility with developers, try to show something off, demo
something that might be a year away, then maybe someone stays up all night to make it
happen. Helps make things happen.
9 How does the actual position differ from your imagined perceptions before you
started?
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You tell somebody you're hiring to be a PM. It's like the elephant and the blind
man. Everyone tells you it's something different. 3 or 4 different PM's had their role
very focused on their particular product. The role sucks you in, a bunch of type A people
all trying to be more type A than the next one. I'm hardcore type A, about 25% of the
people were just totally insane type A. I am a good connections person, connections
between people, facilitating connections. Connecting up various groups was important
for Web Services. Fluid job. My wife is of German descent, she's a Project manager:
Product management is much more fluid and adaptable as opposed to Project
management, which requires total organization of detail above all else.
e Do you think PM is really one role or multiple roles which have not been
thoroughly differentiated in the software industry?
At some point, no matter what the process is, there's a little box where it says, "a
bit of magic happens here". At the end of a car assembly line, there's a group of people
called the "fixers" who do a lot of ad hock fixes. They might have hammers, 2x4's,
pillows. A big part of Product management is the "fixer" job, where the magic happens.
PM could be further divided, but you might lose the magic that keeps it going.
You might cut the magic in the box in making 2 smaller boxes.
* How do you think PM in software differs from PM in traditional companies, for
example, product management of Gillette Foamy or Crest Toothpaste?
At P&G I would guess they have an operations research, or industrial engineering
programs. In manufacturing, you have engineering. Development in software is art.
"I've built transmissions for 20 years; it will take me 4 months to design a new one."
Design is more incremental in traditional electro-mechanical manufacturing.
I was once sitting next to a polymer guy at a multi-cultural engineering event. He
says, I kick six products out a year. He knows it takes 2 months from chemical to
product. Biotech will much more like software in terms of being non-deterministic.
e What do you think is the most important PM challenge in the particular case of
software products?
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Alignment. Alignment of people, of stakeholders, business stakeholders, strategic
stakeholders. Different parts of the companies depending on you or pushing you.
Aligning those people together, getting those people to come together. Even if a group is
outside of the company, you have to get them to align with your interests. It's difficult to
distribute the job and has to come onto one person.
Before Microsoft, I was CTO at Erio, content based image retrieval. Used
Extreme Programming to manage multiple different requirements. I would write a
scenario, developers would give what features could be done this month.
9 Do you feel Microsoft is a software product company? Or is it a hybrid of
products & services? If so, what percentage do you feel is products and what
percent are services?
Hybrid of products and services. 10% hosted services, 10% products that cross
the boundary completely-Microsoft Word, shift F7 is Thesaurus. Allows you to go to a
series of reference books not on the machine. Groove.net is a peer-to-peer collaboration
tool. Use it to work on multiple documents with versioning, for instance. 80% products
like OS and shrink-wrap. Microsoft consulting (MCS) is a single digit percentage.
Technical support is close to 10%, but that's not really professional services in the IT
sense. "Services aren't innovation. They're a way to make money."
9 I have explained the strangler tree problem of system complexity, and of having no
underlying conceptual model in some software, including some Microsoft software.
How does Microsoft address this?
5 years ago I would have completely agreed (that Microsoft had problems with
complexity and underlying conceptual models). I used to work at the W3C. The early
Web was a beautiful thing around the time of HTML 4.0. It had sufficiency but not
complexity. No cascading style sheets yet. We really had a base model. The next tier
got really complicated. The second generation you had CSS, a bunch of XML, dynamic
HTML, all of the scripting languages living on Web pages, a very different place from
1st generation.
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We're heading toward 3rd generation now. One generation is embodied in things
like Flicker and Delicious. These are sort of back to basic building blocks. Facebook is
another one. "I'm not going to be the everything site." Specialized. Delicious: I'm
nothing more than a bookmark site. You can tie some Flicker and some Delicious
together with RSS. You can build a third product or a portal from those components.
Similar to the way people used Web sites five years ago.
Another fork it's yet again even more complex. Interactive Television. Super
complicated Web sites, being able to drag-and-drop stuff. Deliver a full desktop
application in the browser. Even richer UI through the Web.
I am being driven toward that complexity, but the complexity comes at a big cost.
Working on Web Services made me lucky. One of the fundamental problems Web
Services addresses is the very problem we're talking about. Flicker and Delicious create
components of a loosely coupled system. So Web Services are a way to address the
complexity of the Web. It can be impossible to measure the complexity cost. Loosely
coupled systems with well described interfaces are the key. Flicker & Delicious are
greatly componentized systems, and are heavily used.
If you look at mail, MSN mail, gmail, etc. This is a fundamental component that
has been effectively standardized. Services components in general are a very good way
to reduce complexity, Web services or otherwise.
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Shuman Ghosemajumder, Google
DATE: 05/11/2006
SUBJECT: Shuman Ghosemajumder (Sloan MBA)
Business Product Manager, Trust & Safety
(Formerly worked on AdSense)
COMPANY: Google
9 How do you describe the role of (Business) Product manager in your present
position?
Any Product manager is the focal point of the product line. In a matrix
organization, you don't have people directly reporting to you. You are the CEO of the
product without the direct-line authority. You lead a cross-functional team.
* How does the lack of direct line authority affect your job?
Theoretically the lack of authority is a difficulty, but practically it works pretty
well. Of course it is a drawback that you don't have direct-line authority. On the other
hand, you are the leader of that team, and depending on how much respect and practical
authority you have, this makes a large difference. When you have a diverse cross
functional team, you can leverage the strengths of the various organizations to achieve
your goals. At Google, there is a general sense of cooperation and leadership; people
tend to acquiesce to your requests (as the Product manager) because you have established
credibility and trust.
* How does being a non-technical, or at least a non-coder, affect your job?
As a non-coder, you need to work very hard and show the value that you add to
the team, and make the team better in tangible ways. One way you can do this is to
provide the team with greater visibility and access to upper management and the rest of
the corporation. Make the product successful with customers. Groups can kind of "go
rogue" and get accidentally isolated, although this can also happen deliberately in
experimental groups that need to have time to develop something in semi-isolation. At a
company as large as IBM, you can end up with such isolation that you have fairly serious
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duplication of efforts. Google tries to be apolitical and focus on the good of the project.
There's always a challenge dealing with something new and entrepreneurial. Each group
working on a similar product, when you merge these groups, it brings forth new ideas.
9 Does Google split up the role of Product manager somehow? How does this split
between Business and Technical Product management work?
Yes, the role is split. Google has Product Managers and Product Marketing
Managers. Business Product Manager is sort of in the middle. Can lean toward one or
the other (business versus technical). Business Product Management-more of a
traditional business background. PM's used to be extremely technically oriented (early in
Google's growth), used to be all former developers, or people with Ph.D.'s in Computer
Science. Business Product managers came from more of a business background, such as
management consulting. Product Marketing Managers are closer to the traditional
Proctor & Gamble role. PM's / BPM's generally focus on inbound marketing, but have
some outbound responsibilities as well.
* How does the actual position differ from your imagined perceptions before you
started?
When I started, I was not sure what PM was. In my career, I have come full
circle. Much earlier in my career, I was a Software Engineer and PM for a smaller
product at Groupware in Canada, a real-time cooperative desktop publishing
environment. Later worked with McKinsey & IBM. In my startup days, I didn't think of
PM as a specific job. As a new PM at Google, I scrambled to do a bunch of research to
find out what PM really was/is. What I found out is that it isn't a well understood area,
and means different things in different organizations. Now I understand it most clearly as
being the leader of a specific product team at Google. So leadership is the key to the role.
* Do you think PM is really one role or multiple roles which have not been
thoroughly differentiated in the software industry?
Google has differentiated the roles to some degree. Business Product Managers,
Product Marketing Managers, and simply Product Managers are all separate titles. These
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career tracks are on parallel paths, although there is a tremendous amount of overlap.
Product Marketing Managers are probably the most well-defined in terms being focused
on outbound marketing. Associate versions of each exist, for new college grads.
9 How do you think PM in software differs from PM in traditional companies, for
example, product management of Gillette Foamy or Crest Toothpaste?
First, what's the distinction between that kind of consumer packaged goods
management and high-tech? In software, it is a lot more important to focus on customer
feature requests. In high tech products, there aren't a lot of features as in toothpaste. For
instance, customers might like baking soda or other whitening agents, but then it's really
about market segmentation. In the software industry, it is much more important to
maintain feature parity with competitors. However, Google's strategy actually
deemphasizes feature parity relative to other software product companies. We think in
terms of "what can we do that is new and different?"
The difference between general PM vs. PM at Google has to do with creating
brand new technologies. At Google, there's a lot of working with engineering and
figuring out what is the brand new great technology they've managed to invent, and
figuring out how to productize it. For instance, someone has invented a way to
efficiently store 2 Gigabytes per user online, how do we turn that into a product? Google
is a very technology driven, engineering-out kind of company.
e What do you think is the most important PM challenge in the particular case of
software products?
Usability. There is so much complexity associated with computer applications.
Software is like traditional engineering but zero marginal distribution costs. In software
you can create a "million mile long bridge." (Possible, but impractical and useless.)
Creating something that is actually usable becomes very tricky. IPod, for instance, has
80% market share with a small, elegant feature set as opposed to the everything-but-the-
kitchen-sink approach. It's about organization, not just limiting a feature set. There will
be a market for very advanced tools, but make the day to day tasks as fast as possible and
allow novices to pick it up right away.
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As a PM, I try to bring the perspective of the common user back to the teams. I
draw comparisons to analogous products, conduct usability testing-bring the product in
front of actual users. Constantly repeating that usability is the most important thing to
do, and why. Making that a core value. Let's create features, technology, and then worry
about usability? That doesn't work. The biggest trap technical teams fall into is creating
products that are internally consistent and make sense to technical people, more and more
specific, worst case, that make sense only to people who work at a specific company. Or
products that make sense to technical people but not to non-technical people. This affects
everything. Sometimes very technical terms become part of the general language. We
make people understand words like MP3 or "RSS feed". With the term "RSS feed", you
have to explain for 5 minutes, if you're talking to someone who works for the legal
profession, what this means. Why can't we just say, "Subscribe to a Web site?"
What language you use is important, how you organize things. How many
buttons do you have on a mouse? How do people interact with an application? How
about consistency, such as menus?
e Do you feel Google is a software product company? Or is it a hybrid of products
& services? If so, what percentage do you feel is products and what percent are
services?
Google is pretty much 100% software product company. But about 90% of the
product is delivered as Web-based services. We don't do any significant consulting or
selling of programming services.
1. I have explained the strangler tree problem of system complexity, and of
having no underlying conceptual model in some software. How does Google address
this?
The way Google prevents having a negative consequence like this is by putting
the responsibility for having a clean, scalable model be a responsibility of the Technical
Lead. A senior engineer would work with the Product manager to maintain this clean,
scalable model; this underlying conceptual model. A Tech Lead would always be more
technically qualified than the other engineers on the team.
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Google does not generally have Program managers (this title does exist but is not
part of the regular organization the way it is at companies like Microsoft). Product
managers fulfill the role Program managers fill at Microsoft. This makes the role of PM
more of an overloaded role. Rather than segmenting out the specific functions, hire more
Product managers for a specific product and give autonomy to specific features and
subsections of the product. Keep the role as nexus of cross functionality but have an
increased number of "nexi".
In terms of work life balance, some people work all the time, I am on email
basically all the time, sometimes responding to emails at 2 a.m. I spend time at home
working from there, spending time with the family. People don't work too much on
weekends. Travel is proportional to your interest in doing it. There is a lot of flexibility
to find a mode of work that works well for you. There isn't a "policeman on the corner"
mentality, as long as you're achieving your goals on a quarterly basis. It is about
achieving goals, not face time for the sake of face time.
2. How did the huge public IPO and all the recent publicity affect your job, or
the culture at Google?
Not a lot of change after IPO. Google behaved like a public company before IPO,
driven by quarterly results. Were always driven by a need to deliver value to users.
Never thought of it in terms of competing with feature sets. No pressure to create
strategies around competitors. Whenever Google does something, they do something to
deliver great value to users and hopefully it is different from competitors. It is very
important at Google not to simply one-up competitors. The opposite of the fast-follower
philosophy. Still, it is important to be responsive to the needs of customers.
3. Any final comments you'd like to share about Product management?
I've learned PM is all about your individual character. One thing I heard about
PM was to always remember as a PM that you are the one person on the team that is
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completely disposable. If you always remember that, keep your eye on the ball of adding
maximum value to team, then you will be successful.
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Appendix C: Interview with Professor Daniel Jackson
DATE: 04/06/2006
SUBJECT: Daniel Jackson
Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science
SCHOOL: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Biographical Note
Daniel Jackson leads the Software Design Group in the Computer Science and
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at M.I.T. He received an MA from Oxford
University (1984) in Physics, and his SM (1988) and PhD (1992) from M.I.T. in
Computer Science.
Note on Interview Transcript Censorship
Professor Jackson spoke freely, informally, and allowed this researcher to use a
recording device. Certain quotes involving commercial concerns and military
agencies have been censored or "anonymized." Significant affected quotes are
noted. Words and phrases replacing anonymized content appear [italicized in
brackets]. Words and phrases not actually spoken but added for clarity appear in
[brackets] but are not italicized.
TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS:
[Informal introductory chatting]
PROFESSOR JACKSON: [Alloy modeling language] allows you to analyze
models in isolation. You never have to actually analyze the code. It helps you to
debug your thinking about the system.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, I understand.
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: The second respect in which it is not verification is
that all existing verification systems would make you actually prove theorems.
And the sort of fundamental premise of Alloy was that what the modeler needed
was a sort of push-button automation that you'd build your model and say OK, is
that right?
JOHN HEMPE: I took the [Nancy] Leveson course on Software Engineering,
and the essence I got from her class was that formal verification doesn't work.
And there's still some argument about lightweight formal methods, but I've never
seen it in industry, at least not in the enterprise software industry. Maybe in
some fly-by-wire jet fighter software or something, but it just seems like the
methods themselves are too complex for average professionals.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: You have to remember that the software industry, by
and large, is extraordinarily conservative. Which is very surprising for a bunch of
people who consider themselves radicals.
JOHN HEMPE: Define conservative in this context.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: They don't want to change the way they do things.
They want to rely on, sort of, lift your finger and feel the wind. They don't want to
consider the possibility that computers could help you design software. You look,
for example, at the astonishing vehemence with which Extreme Programming
has attacked the idea of design.
JOHN HEMPE: Yes.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: It is not the method. It's the idea that you could
design a system. It's deeply unfashionable to suggest the idea that a system
could be designed.
JOHN HEMPE: True. These methods like Agile, Scrum, XP, these tight iterative
methods--
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: What they're confusing is the principle of risk
management in which you don't want to make decisions for which you don't have
information, versus the idea that even when you're capable of making predictions
and good decisions you should just blunder ahead anyway and pay whatever
price it costs to fix it.
What they essentially do is all the design in the code, which is an extraordinarily
expensive way to do things. In the face of all their criticisms of formal methods,
it's amazing how much work these people are prepared to do
The other thing that is, perhaps not conservative but part of the same
stubbornness, is this idea that, well, why think about requirements, because they
change? Right? Now, I don't believe this. And the reason I don't believe this is
the following.. .[although] requirements shifts are a huge source of complexity in
system development, the XP people are working, by and large, for very
conservative companies..
JOHN HEMPE: Ah, I did not know that.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: My guess is that the reason the requirements
changed is because they never bothered to really understand. I'm being very
polemical now. But I think what often happens is, from the software engineer's
perspective the requirements have changed. But the [business laymen] on the
other side says, "How did you ever not understand that? What did you think we
were doing?" And they're amazed at the idea. [They're thinking], "We didn't
change our requirements, we always wanted to do it like this." So, there's just a
reluctance to spend time with the customer and truly understand what their
problem is.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, right. And that's definitely part of what I'm exploring. A
typical quote from an average coder I know is, "I've never met a competent
marketing person." It just seems like somewhere the pipeline of actual
requirements to engineers who write code gets broken down, and then the
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engineers get blamed for everything, or [perhaps I should say], the programmers
get blamed for everything.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Right, exactly. That's exactly what happens. And
one of the reasons is that the initial attempt to characterize the problem is not
sufficiently appreciated as a technical problem. It's thought to be something that
needs less technical expertise. But it needs more technical expertise. It's the
essence of the whole enterprise: figuring out what you're trying to do. So, that, I
think, is a large part of the problem.
If you look at something like alloy, or formal methods, in its purest form, the
actual proposal is a very simple one: at the beginning, you should figure out
what problem you're trying to solve, and you should have some fairly precise
characterization of that problem. Now, you can characterize that on a very wide
spectrum. At the most economical end, in a form which I think is economical for
almost every software development [effort], you simply document the state of the
system. You simply say, in formal terms, this is exactly the set of states I expect
the system to be in.
Now, people are shocked at this idea, and if you said to them, well, here's a
formal language for doing this, they'll throw up their hands and say, "I cannot
possibly do this. This is absurd. I'm not going to use Alloy, or VDM, or Zed, or
whatever, to specify the states of my system."
But, on the other hand, if you show them SQL and asked them if they'd write a
database schema, they'd say, "Oh, I'll write a database schema, that's no
problem at all."
JOHN HEMPE: Which is essentially a formal method of specifying-
PROFESSOR JACKSON: The identical thing. It is a formal description of the
defined states of the system. And in fact, many people write integrity constraints
over their database, which are invariants!
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JOHN HEMPE: I'm trying to think of this from a purely professional, pedestrian
point of view. [The writing of database schemas] is known as a highly
leverageable skill. That particular tight skill of doing SQL schemas and
verification, you can get hired at hundreds of companies, from Oracle on down.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Perhaps what this means is the people who build
database systems, they know they need the schema because their application
generator, their transaction processor, or whatever, is going to have to take that
schema as input. No schema, no system! It's as simple as that, right?
JOHN HEMPE: True.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: The people who are building applications that don't
require SQL schemas perhaps don't realize that they need a schema too. And
the people building the database know that, if they don't have a schema, it's not
just that they can't construct a database. They also won't have a basis to think
about transactions they're going to run, or how the system's going to evolve over
time. They don't have a way of saying, well, our business model is truly reflective
of the software we're constructing. So, for them, the schema is like the first
concrete representation that there's actually some understanding of what's going
on in the problem domain.
My contention is that it's really not so radical to say, whatever kind of system
you're building, even if it doesn't have a database in it, you really need a schema
of some sort.
JOHN HEMPE: Or you'll create one implicitly as you code.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: And the kind you'll create will be one full of strangler
trees. That's the problem, right? And, so, what happens in my mind when you
create such a schema is, it's extremely difficult and painful, because you're doing
real work, right? And what you should be forced to do is.. .one of the things a
formal language makes you do, whether the language is Alloy, or SQL, or even
UML is, it doesn't give you any corner to hide. (Actually, UML gives you some.)
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But, a real formal language gives you no corner to hide. You've got to write it
down, right?
JOHN HEMPE: Right.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: What that means is, you can't punt, you can't say, "I'll
figure it out later." You've got to actually commit to something. The reason that's
good is, when you actually write down what you think the situation is, it is a
horrible mess. Then you take a step back and say, "Now this is a real mess. It
can't be like this." In the worst case, you have to go back to the problem domain
and say, you know, our organization is so complicated that we've got to simplify
things before we try to support it with automation, right?
But in the more common case, you say, "There must be a simpler way of viewing
this." And you come up with some kind of abstraction or some way of thinking
about it that generalizes appropriately or simplifies. Or you say, "You know what,
I thought of the system structures being like this because I had in mind all these
complicated functions, but you know what? We don't need to support those
functions in our first release. We should have a simpler model, and with this
dramatic simplification we can support 90% of the functions we want to support
at 10% of the cost in the schema. So I think that's a tremendously valuable
activity...
One other thing. There's a very positive part of Extreme Programming. It's this
sort of nose-to-the-grindstone aspect. It's that, if you're not going to write
schema but if you write code, you're writing Java classes, you're writing a
schema in Java. What they're really saying, in a way, and I say this in the
introduction to my book, it's very similar to the Alloy approach. From Day One,
start dealing with the details.
My gripe with Extreme Programming is that the only way they know of to deal
with the details is by writing code, but there are much simpler languages than
code.
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JOHN HEMPE: I see.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Alloy, to a novice, might seem complicated, but
semantically it is enormously simpler than any programming language. I mean,
basically, all you've got is sets and relations, that's it. It's like a database schema
but... actually, it's basically the same as a relational database schema.
JOHN HEMPE: I still feel like you'd need an "Alloy for Dummies," <chuckles>.
"Here's the set theory you need, here's what SAT [the Boolean Satisfiability
Problem] is...."
PROFESSOR JACKSON: You shouldn't need to know SAT. SAT is just a
background thing, part of the engine.
JOHN HEMPE: I think part of it is getting something well known and
[professionally] leverageable enough. Back in 2001, I knew that, if I became a
Sun Certified Java Programmer, then N number of companies would hire me,
and any sort of formal language or true design discipline beyond knowing just
basic UML nomenclature, it wouldn't get you hired as a professional.
It's a matter of showing the power, and showing that an average professional can
think on that level. And I sometimes wonder if we sometimes just run into
cognitive limits where, it's really hard to think in these advanced ways.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: But it's just abstraction, right?
JOHN HEMPE: Absolutely. Abstraction is the most noble, but also the most
difficult form of thinking.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I agree, I think you're right, but why should you think
the average professional would need to do that? Why isn't it just like the schema
designer?
JOHN HEMPE: The Architect.
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: Yes, the architect. It's going to be a smaller group of
people who do that kind of work.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, right.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: And the rest of the people will do much more
concrete work, dealing with the details of the code.
JOHN HEMPE: So the important thing is to have a few key experts who are able
to specify the system in this formal language.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I think that is essential.
JOHN HEMPE: I agree, in principle.
[Significant quote censored at Jackson's request]
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I think that what you find is that, in the really
successful systems, in the most successful systems, at some point, someone
has to come in and really understand what's going on. There's this sort of very
modern belief that you can have fully decentralized, organic systems in which no
individual person really understands what's going on and the whole thing can
work. I don't know how far that can honestly go. I think, in the end, that the
edifice crumbles. Or you just get fed up with all the rough edges between the
parts.
JOHN HEMPE: So you did it, to some degree, though, in trying to rewrite the
80,000 line CM of the Air Traffic Controller engine. OK, well we'll just understand
this part, and rewrite all that, and then everything will be better.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: We did that [as a research project], but it would never
have been any use in context of the system as a whole to do that. The real
lesson was that if we had really understood that system we could have
dramatically simplified it, the whole thing. We did dramatically simplify the piece
we were looking at, but the whole system could probably have been simplified.
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I think one of the things that you need is a very simple notion of what problem
you're trying to solve. As I get older, I become more and more narrow minded
about the importance of simplicity. You always hear people say, in industry, "You
academics don't understand. It's not that simple."
JOHN HEMPE: Right.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: And I'm becoming more and more unrepentant about
this.
JOHN HEMPE: "You business people don't understand that it can be that
simple if you do the work."
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Yes. I won't say that it can be that simple in that you
can obtain the same level of functionality, maybe you can't! It might take a lot of
work to do it. Yet when you look at the most successful things, often it was really
simplicity.
JOHN HEMPE: Yes. My personal theory of why the Web works has to do with
the fact that we're basically intelligent apes and the Web uses ostensive
definition and pictures, and we're really good at processing visual information
and ostensive definition-point at things.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: It's not just that, it's that having a human in the loop
of every Web transaction means that you can tolerate programs that are
incredibly unreliable. The system can tolerate all kinds of unpredictable things.
[The following is anonymized at Jackson's request]
I've head that [one company's] attitude is that basically, the Web site can do
anything wrong so long as the actual transaction of buying the merchandise is
OK. So you ... get the wrong [nonessential things], how much does it matter? So
long as most of the time you're getting it right. And when people say, "I want
that," it works. As long as they get that right and bill the right amount on their
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credit card, which is probably only a tiny bit of the system. And they've got this
huge edifice of stuff all around it.
The advantage of it is, most of the system doesn't have to work that well. Now,
probably hospital databases are not like that. They can't afford to have a lot of
stuff that isn't working exactly right.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, and similar safety critical systems.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Right.
JOHN HEMPE: Microsoft, their Program managers are more technical than
most. They invented that role. There were no Program managers before
Microsoft. So they have the formal roles. They have Product Marketing
managers, Product managers, Program managers, and then Developers. Well,
and Project managers. But it really is kind of a pipeline in from the market
inwards, as much as they could possibly do.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: But there doesn't seem to be any role for a
Conceptual Designer there.
JOHN HEMPE: When you say "Conceptual Designer", I think "Architect." Let's
say, "Conceptual Architect."
PROFESSOR JACKSON: The kind of thing I'm thinking of is, you're building a
Word Processor, right? And someone says, "We'd like to have Sections with all
these things." Where's the guy who says, "Wait a minute, this is a paragraph
based Word Processor. We don't have sections."
JOHN HEMPE: But Microsoft has some of the smartest people in the world.
Surely there's someone in there who is smart enough to do that. It must happen
at least at a small scale on some teams.
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: It does. It certainly does. But I think the question is
also one of, simply, tradeoffs in terms of where you want to pay the price.
[Remainder of quote censored at Jackson's request.]
JOHN HEMPE: And, they're known as a fast-follower.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Exactly.
[Remainder of quote censored at Jackson's request.].
JOHN HEMPE: Right.
[The following quote is anonymized]
PROFESSOR JACKSON: My conclusion from that book was that one of the
things that allowed them to kill [a competitor] is the fact that they had the guts to
hack down the strangler trees and clear the forest and start again.
JOHN HEMPE: They did do that. Although I thought it was being a little
generous to call it "judo" giving it [the browser] away, I thought that was definitely
a "sumo" crushing technique, the ultimate price war, give it away. In that, I
thought he was a little generous to Microsoft, but you're right, they certainly came
up with what turned out to be a superior architecture, at least in the short term.
Netscape eventually gave their source away, starting the Mozilla project.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I'm unfortunately going to have to go to a meeting in
a few minutes. We can carry on another time, though. Where have we got to?
JOHN HEMPE: Are there any, thinking in terms of the requirements
engineering, the product management, the conceptual architect ideas, are there
any proceedings from the IEEE conference, or any sources you want to give me?
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Well, it sounds a little self-serving, but I've done
some collaboration with my father. He's written some papers I'd recommend.
Some are rather technical, but some are more overview ones. He had this idea
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that, when you think about requirements, you want to think about multiple
problems being solved, and to think about those problems independently. I think
that's quite a powerful idea.
I would say that my biggest complaint about the way people do requirements is
that there's a deeper rationality. A requirements document is often a very long
list of very detailed functions. This is not a rational way to say what you require.
If you're going to buy a car.. .you would never say, "Here are my 58
requirements." You would say, "First and foremost, I want something that looks
cool and has a top that comes down. Then, I suppose I should have high fuel
efficiency, and so on."
Our fundamental approach, in life, to make all decisions is that we prioritize. To
me, the biggest failure of requirements engineering is that I almost never see
requirements documents that are prioritized. That say, "There's an awful lot of
stuff in the list we're about to give you, but here's the essence. Here's what
we're really trying to achieve."
Now, people, like with simplicity, have all kinds of reasons why in practice, this
won't work. In practice, there are never few enough for this to be well articulated
and separated. I'm sure the Extreme Programming people would tell us that you
will never [before implementation] be able to assess the different risks and put
values on these things. But, so what? You've got to do that. You do that in life
all the time, when you do risk management and make decisions. You assign
values to things, and you assign risks, using imperfect information. Sometimes
you get it wrong, but that doesn't stop you from doing it.
JOHN HEMPE: And sometimes, in business, it seems like there's this
temptation to jump straight to the nuts and bolts, and just have this huge bucket
of nuts and bolts dumped out in a document.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Exactly. It's not a smart way to go. I think that it's a
really, really serious problem in software requirements, that people think it's all
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the technical problems. Now we know that yeah, programming costs you a lot of
money, but that's not the real problem. The real problem is, you know, what
was-when IBM and TRW and those companies failed in this huge FAA
development-what was wrong with it was they had completely unrealistic
requirements. No one had a requirements review. Which they had later with all
kinds of august panels, where, some experts listened to basically what the
government, the FAA, had told IBM and said, "Why did you agree with this? This
is crazy! Three seconds of downtime a year?"
JOHN HEMPE: Right. I read that paper.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: And I think this applies for all kinds of systems,
whether information systems, safety critical systems, business systems, startup
companies, everyone seems to think, "I don't need to do that work." And I don't
buy it.
Startup companies ask themselves, "Well, we need to get something out in time
for the VC's." But, what's the priority? What's really going to impress them?
Now, some people will do that explicitly, but they won't think of that, they'll think
of working around the requirements process. "I don't have time to do a proper
requirements thing here. So, I'd like all these engineering people off my back,
get rid of all these formal methods people. I'm a tactical guy, I'd like to figure out
how to please the VC's."
That's a perfectly rational thing, if that's what you need to do. If you've decided
that the first thing you need is funding, and then it's going to be a prototype you
can throw away, go for it! Then you need to think about your requirements really
carefully. You need to say, "What does it mean to produce something that will
impress the VC's?"
JOHN HEMPE: The problem is that the prototype usually doesn't get thrown
away, and it becomes the seed of the strangler tree following very soon behind it.
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: That's exactly right! Then you've got to be really
honest about whether you're going to throw it away or not, that's exactly right.
But I think that what's causing a lot of problems in requirements engineering is a
failure to apply these very basic common sense things. It's not clear to me why
people aren't doing it, to be honest.
JOHN HEMPE: Right, right. I think I have some idea. I think there's a strong
temptation to just get down and code, because that's what people know. That's
the leverageable, widespread skill people have. Frankly, it requires a lower level
of thinking. I remember reading about how Samuel Coleridge wrote about
generalizing being the highest form of thought. Well, it is, but it's also more
difficult.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: There's another phenomenon, I think, it's the,
"Nobody got fired for buying IBM."
It's that, if you're going to change this stuff, you're going to have to be the
manager who says, "Now, wait a minute. We're not going to produce any code
or documentation for a week. We're going to sit in front of the whiteboard and
we're going to brainstorm."
JOHN HEMPE: Which scares the hell out of those used to the usual mundane
methods--
PROFESSOR JACKSON: "We're going to lose a week's productivity by drinking
coffee and chatting?" You've got to be a gutsy manager to do that, right? And I
can understand that. From a research perspective, we do that all the time,
because we don't have anyone breathing down our necks. We have much more
flexibility in terms of when we deliver value, and so on. I think that, somehow,
one of the advantages, paradoxically, of formal methods and that kind of stuff, is
that if you do modeling, you can demonstrate [the models] and you can produce
stuff in the early phase, that is indicative of real value.
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JOHN HEMPE: Something people can get their hands [minds] around and look
at visually.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: This phenomenon--I should really go, and I'm
enjoying this conversation.
[An extended exchange involving DARPA defense contracting was censored at
Jackson's request for security and industrial relations reasons.]
JOHN HEMPE: I don't want to suck up the rest of your afternoon. You talked
about your father's papers....
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I'll need to send you the ones I mentioned because it
will be hard for you to find one.
JOHN HEMPE: Sure, ok. Maybe you could email me.. .some of your most
relevant papers.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: I think, actually, although I'm somewhat skeptical
about the whole Extreme Programming world. I think some of the people who
write on that stuff are pretty smart. I think some of the lessons of The Mythical
Man-Month are still relevant.
JOHN HEMPE: Yes, I've read that.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Of course, you've obviously read that... I should send
you some stuff by Martin Thomas. There's a guy who started a formal methods
company called Praxis in Britain which has been very successful.
JOHN HEMPE: I've read a paper on that.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: He's a very interesting guy. Let me see... I'll look
those two things up for you.
JOHN HEMPE: O.K.. .Well, thanks a lot for taking some time with me.
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PROFESSOR JACKSON: Oh, fun to talk to you.
JOHN HEMPE: Thanks! We should talk again.
PROFESSOR JACKSON: Yes, let's talk again.
JOHN HEMPE: Absolutely.
*****TAPE TERMINATES*****
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